

Perceived Deservingness and the Toleration of Human Rights Violations:
The Problem and a Possible Solution

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Abstract

Despite general endorsement of universal human rights, people continue to tolerate specific human rights violations. I conducted a two-part study to investigate this issue. For Part I, I examined whether people tolerated torture (a human rights violation) based on the morality and deservingness of the target. Participants tolerated torture more when the target had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression. This effect was mediated by the target's perceived deservingness for harsh treatment, and held over and above participants' abstract support for the right to humane treatment. For Part II, hypocrisy induction was used in an attempt to reduce participants' toleration of the torture. Participants were assigned to either the hypocrisy induction or control condition. Unexpectedly, participants who tolerated the torture more in Part I reduced their toleration the most in the control condition, possibly because of consistency and floor effects. Limitations and implications of the findings are discussed.

Keywords: deservingness, torture, human rights, hypocrisy, cognitive dissonance

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Perceived Deservingness and the Toleration of Human Rights Violations:

The Problem and a Possible Solution

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was originally drafted in response to the atrocities that took place during the Holocaust: It was meant to prevent those acts and others like them from occurring in the future (United Nations, 2014a). The UDHR outlines those rights that are seen as fundamental and to which all humans are entitled. The rights are fundamental in that they are granted to all people simply because they are human, and are not additional privileges that are determined by government officials or based on the region in which people live. The rights are universal in that they are guaranteed to literally everyone, regardless of characteristics of individuals, such as race, sex, and so on. The declaration is now used as a standard for international law (Pederson, 2009). However, despite its importance, what the UDHR lays out might not be consistent with how people actually react to relevant situations. Specifically, although these rights are deemed universal, there are situations in which human rights violations are tolerated (e.g., Taylor, 2013). Moreover, a disconnect may exist between individuals' expressed support for human rights and their toleration of violations of those rights in specific situations or contexts.

The first goal of my thesis was to look at one factor that might help explain the toleration of specific human rights violations as well as help account for the discrepancy between acceptance of universal human rights and the toleration of violations of those rights in specific situations. The factor on which I focused was the perceived deservingness of specific targets for human rights abuses. The second goal of my thesis was to look at whether or not toleration for rights violations in specific situations could

be decreased by highlighting the inconsistency between individuals' toleration and their abstract support for the human rights being violated.

I will first review previous research showing an inconsistency between the position people endorse in an abstract sense and their reactions in specific situations, including situations involving human rights. After establishing that people do tend to display inconsistencies between their abstract attitudes and their responses to specific situations, I provide evidence for the idea that individuals have a need to see that people get what they deserve. Then I discuss how the need to see that people get what they deserve might contribute to the toleration of human rights violations and how this could help explain the discrepancy between supporting human rights in the abstract and tolerating violations of those rights in specific situations. Finally, I explain the method I used for reducing this discrepancy, known as "hypocrisy induction."

Although previous studies have established that people are willing to tolerate or even support treatment that violates human rights (e.g., Carlsmith & Sood, 2009) even though they might support these universal human rights in the abstract (Staerklé & Clémence, 2004), no research has directly looked into the role that deservingness plays in the toleration of human rights violations. Moreover, no research has been conducted on whether or not hypocrisy induction can be used to help encourage people to act in support of human rights. Rather, hypocrisy induction has mainly been used to promote positive health behaviour (e.g., Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone, Wiegand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997) and to encourage environmentally friendly practices (e.g., Kantola, Syme, & Campbell, 1984). The study that I present adds to the current literature by filling these gaps.

Part I: The Problem

Abstract Versus Specific Responses

There are several researchers who have looked at situations where people support a position in the abstract, but act in a way that is inconsistent with their abstract position when dealing with a specific situation or context. Each of these examples shows how abstract judgements fail to take the influence of situational factors into account. That is, by failing to realize what influences their responses in specific situations, people can express general support for an abstract position while responding to specific situations in a way that contradicts that position.

Batson's theorizing on moral behaviour (Batson & Thompson, 2001; Batson, Thompson, Seufferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999) illustrates one type of discrepancy between abstract ideals and behaviour in specific situations. According to Batson, people might behave in a way that is inconsistent with their abstract moral standards. One reason for this discrepancy is that people's moral integrity (their motivation to act morally) is overpowered by situational factors that cause them to disengage from their standards (see Batson & Thompson, 2001; Batson et al., 1999). Known as "overpowered integrity," this form of hypocritical behaviour occurs without the actor's full awareness. Batson and colleagues (1999) explain that, in such cases, individuals' moral intentions are disconnected from their behaviour, so they do not associate their actions in those situations with their moral principles. One factor that contributes to overpowering individuals' moral integrity is the abstractness of moral principles. These principles tend to be overly general and do not take into account how people selectively apply these principles on the basis of characteristics of specific situations (Batson & Thompson,

2001; for related ideas see “moral exclusion” [Staub, 1990] or “moral disengagement” [Bandura, 1991]). This disconnect allows people to continue looking and feeling like they are moral, despite behaving in a way that is immoral (Batson et al., 1999). Although this explanation was originally applied to moral motivations, it could also explain discrepancies between abstract opinions and situation-specific behaviour in other realms.

The literature on psychology and the law contains further examples of circumstances in which people’s abstract principles are at odds with how they respond to specific situations. People often express support for certain laws, yet still respond to individual cases in ways that contradict those same laws (Finkel, 2001). Characteristics of specific cases, such as suffering of victims or alleged perpetrators, can lead people to form opinions about the case that are inconsistent with the legal principles that they would otherwise support. According to Finkel (2001), when people are asked about their general support for a given law, they tend not to take into account how they will be affected by this case-specific information. Rather, they determine their sentiment toward a given law based on whatever exemplar is most readily available, which could be overly general or not representative of typical cases. For example, in research by Finkel (2001) on right-to-die, people’s rulings over removing life support systems were affected by whether or not the patient was terminally ill and the extent to which the patient was in pain. Importantly, people responded in this way despite pre-existing support for the abstract, legal definition of the right-to-die. Much like the situational pressures that overpowered people’s abstract moral principles in Batson and colleagues’ studies, Finkel (2001) noted that the characteristics of individual cases overwhelm people’s support for abstract legal principles.

Research on motivations behind punishment provides another example of a context in which individuals' responses to specific situations are inconsistent with their abstract principles. When asked about their motives for punishment, people tend to indicate a combination of two motives: deterrence (punishing offenders in order to deter others from committing crimes in the future) and retribution or "just-deserts" (a desire to punish offenders in proportion to the harm done so they receive their "just-deserts"; see Darley & Pittman, 2003). However, when faced with specific cases, they actually tend to assign punishment in a way that is more consistent with retributive motives (Carlsmith, 2008; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). That is, although people in part favour a deterrence approach to justice in an abstract sense, they respond according to retributive principles when presented with specific instances of injustice. One possible reason for this discrepancy is that the initial retributive motivation to punish may come from an automatic or intuitive response to an observed transgression (see Darley, 2009). Because these retributive motives are automatic, people may not be fully aware of the effect these motives have on their judgements. If people are not aware of what will motivate them in specific cases, then they will not take those factors into account when determining whether or not they support something in the abstract.

In relation to human rights in particular, Staerklé and Clémence (2004) argued that, even for people who endorse human rights in the abstract, toleration of the violation of those rights often depends on factors that are relevant to the specific context or situation. Two of these factors are the perceived acceptability of the victim's behaviour and whether or not the violation is framed in a way that highlights the connection between the specific violation and one's abstract support for the human rights being

violated: In the case of Staerklé & Clémence (2004), the framing manipulation was whether the violation is framed as a news story or as a story about a human rights violation. People presumably do not take into account the possible influence of these contextual factors when giving their abstract attitudes toward the human rights being violated. Across two studies, Staerklé and Clémence (2004) found mixed support for this reasoning. In both studies, as expected, participants generally supported certain human rights, but these attitudes were not necessarily consistent with their responses to specific violations of these human rights. In the first study, Staerklé and Clémence attempted to manipulate the contextual factors of the acceptability of the target's behaviour (e.g., in one case, the target of the human rights violation had either shoplifted or trafficked drugs) and whether the story was framed as explicitly rights-oriented or simply as a news story. Unfortunately, the first manipulation was largely unsuccessful. With regards to the second manipulation, participants tended to be more tolerant of the violation when it was framed as rights-oriented versus a news story, but the underlying mechanisms behind this effect were not tested and, therefore, remain unclear. Despite the study's limitations, results did show that toleration of human rights violations varied as a function of the behaviour of the target portrayed, regardless of participants' abstract support for the relevant right. In the second study, the behaviour of the target of the human rights violation was not manipulated but the results did indicate that the more unacceptable the target's behaviour, the more willing participants were to tolerate the human rights violation. Thus, although the mechanism is not entirely clear, Staerklé and Clémence offer evidence that, even within the realm of human rights, abstract attitudes can be overpowered by situation-specific factors.

In the previous paragraphs, I presented several examples of a discrepancy between people's abstract attitudes and their responses to relevant situations. In each case, it seems that abstract attitudes or standards fail to take the influence of situational factors into account. This failure to take into account the influence of situational factors when forming abstract attitudes is consistent with construal level theory, or CLT (see Trope & Liberman, 2010). The basic argument posed by CLT is that there is a bidirectional relationship between distance and construal level: distant objects are construed at a higher level and, likewise, higher-level construal primes people to think of more distant objects (see Trope & Liberman, 2010). When dealing with an abstract or psychologically distant issue, people will construe the issue at a higher level. As such, their evaluations will be more reflective of the person's general ideology or attitude. However, when the issue is psychologically near—as in the case of concrete examples—construal will be at a lower level. As such, evaluations will be more sensitive to contextual and situational factors rather than the individual's general attitude (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Additionally, when construing situations at a higher level, people tend to focus more on abstract principles rather than concrete, situational factors (Agerström, Björklund, & Carlsson, 2013). This relation between psychological distance and construal level could help explain situations where people express support for an abstract attitude, but respond to some situations in a way that is inconsistent with that position. The evidence from studies on CLT indicates that abstract attitudes and responses to specific situations are construed at different levels and, therefore, are not influenced by the same factors (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Thus, it makes sense that abstract attitudes and responses to specific situations would at times be discrepant.

Summary. In summary, there are several areas of research that show how people's abstract attitudes can be discrepant from their responses to specific situations. One general explanation of these discrepancies is that, when people report their abstract attitudes, they fail to take into account how situational pressures will influence their responses in specific contexts. Situational pressures can arise from a number of sources. Most relevant to the present thesis, when people report their abstract opinions, they might fail to account for how other underlying motivations and needs influence them in specific situations. Similar to Hafer (2011), I propose that a need to see that people get what they deserve contributes to the toleration of human rights violations in specific situations, such that people tolerate human rights violations to the extent that targets of these violations are seen to deserve negative treatment. Furthermore, I propose that the need to see that people get what they deserve (and, therefore, the degree to which individuals are seen to deserve negative treatment) is a factor that can help account for the discrepancy between toleration of human rights violations and the endorsement of these universal human rights in the abstract. Before explaining my rationale in detail, in the following section I review evidence that people are strongly motivated to see that people get what they deserve.

Evidence that People Need to See that Individuals Get What They Deserve

There are several theories and areas of research that suggest that people have a need to see that they and others get what they deserve; these include equity theory, just-world theory, and research on retributive motivation for punishment. In the next few paragraphs, I describe each of these perspectives on deservingness motives.

Equity theory. Equity theorists claim that people are not simply concerned with whether or not their outcomes are favourable, so much as whether those outcomes are fair

and deserved (Adams, 1965). According to equity theory, fairness and deservingness are defined in terms of “equity”: People will perceive their outcomes as equitable, and thus fair and deserved, when the proportion of their outcome to their input is equal to the proportion of relevant others’ outcome to input (i.e., $\text{Outcome}_A/\text{Input}_A = \text{Outcome}_B/\text{Input}_B$; Adams, 1965). Relevant others are similar others or others who are involved in the same exchange. For instance, an individual who perceives a co-worker as getting more from a company for the same amount of work would experience a state of inequity, whereas an individual who perceives a co-worker as getting the same from a company for the same amount of work would experience a state of equity.

Equity theorists propose that inequitable relationships result in an amount of distress that is proportional to the amount of inequity being experienced and that those who experience inequity will try to eliminate the resulting distress by restoring equity (Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). If the perceiver cannot restore actual equity to the relationship, then she or he can restore psychological equity by distorting his or her perception of the relationship. Interestingly, this model holds up even when the inequitable relationship is one where the perceiver is getting more than is equitable or deserved (Skitka, Winkler, & Hutchinson, 2003; Walster et al., 1973). When this is the case, people might give up their own resources in order to restore equity to the relationship (i.e., make sure that they are not getting more than they actually deserve). Thus, the motivation to see that people get what is deserved can override immediate self-interest.

The adherence to equity norms, at the cost of satisfying immediate self-interest, is thought to be the result of a belief that people can maximize their outcomes in the long

run if they and their group act equitably compared to if everyone were to act without regard for anyone else (Walster et al., 1973). In this way, a major assumption underlying equity theory is that humans are primarily selfish: People behave equitably because they believe it will allow them to maximize their outcomes in the long term. Through this cooperative system where those who adhere to equity norms are rewarded and those who violate them are punished, everyone in the group collectively benefits from acting equitably, allowing one's own long-term outcomes to be enhanced. Thus, equity theorists view the need to see that others get what they deserve as rooted in self-interest. This interest in getting what is deserved in terms of equity has been observed in both humans and non-human species (Brosnan, 2006; Brosnan & DeWaal, 2003).

In summary, equity theory provides one explanation for why people need to see that they and others get what they deserve. By making relationships and exchanges equitable (i.e., based on what parties in the relationship deserve), people are able to maximize their outcomes in the long run.

Just-world theory. Another perspective on the need to see that people get what they deserve comes from just-world theory. According to this view, people are motivated to see that they and others get what is deserved in order to maintain the belief that the world is a just place. A just world, according to this theory, is one in which people get what they deserve based on their character or behaviour (e.g., good people receive good outcomes, bad people receive bad outcomes). Lerner (1980) referred to this belief as the “fundamental delusion.”

According to Lerner and colleagues (Lerner, 1977; Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976), the concern with deservingness starts when children learn to delay immediate

gratification in favour of investing in long-term goals (Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). In order to pass up a short-term reward in favour of a supposedly greater long-term reward, people need to have some security that their investment will actually pay off and be more worthwhile than immediate rewards. If they cannot be confident that their efforts will pay off, then people are less likely to invest in the long-term goal. Thus, people develop a need to believe that the world is a just place where everyone gets what they deserve.

The belief in a just world serves a number of important functions. First, as already implied, the belief in a just world allows people to set long-term goals. If people are able to believe that, so long as they are good and work hard, they can achieve their desired goals, then investing time and effort into long-term goals becomes a reasonable option. A number of studies show evidence of this function (Callan, Shead, & Olson, 2009; Hafer, 2000; Hafer, Bègue, Choma, & Dempsey, 2005). More generally, if people believe that they will get what they deserve in life, assuming they also believe that they deserve positive outcomes, then they can assume that victimization and other aversive outcomes are avoidable and unlikely to happen to them (Higgins, St. Amand, & Poole, 1997; Sutton et al., 2008). Furthermore, a belief in a just world is thought to give people a sense of meaning because it provides a framework for understanding life events (Dalbert, 2001).

Because the belief in a just world serves these important functions, when people observe an injustice, they are motivated to correct the situation so the belief in a just world can be maintained. This can be done through methods such as compensating the victim, punishing the offender, or changing one's perceptions of the event (Hafer &

Gosse, 2010; Lerner, 1980). In some situations, this can mean altering perceptions of the victim of the injustice, as in focusing on negative characteristics of a victim that make it seem like she or he deserved victimization (Giacopassi & Wilkinson, 1985; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). Thus, although there are obvious advantages to believing that the world is just, the need to believe in a just world can also lead people to reach flawed conclusions.

In summary, theory and research on the belief in a just world suggests that people need to see that individuals get what they deserve because they are motivated to maintain a belief that the world is just. Without such a belief, people are less confident that their long-term investments will pay-off, are not as able to believe that they can avoid negative outcomes, and lack a sense of meaning in life.

Retributive motivation for punishment. Research on laypeople's motives for punishment provides further evidence that people have a strong need to see that individuals get what they deserve. As already noted in the section on abstract versus specific responses, research shows that people are motivated to see that wrongdoers get their "just deserts" when it comes to punishment, also known as a retributive motive. The fair and deserved punishment is one that is proportionate to the moral reprehensibility of the transgression (Darley, 2009). Thus, factors that affect the degree of punishment desired would be those that influence the perceived moral reprehensibility of the crime. For example, the more the transgressor intended to commit the crime or to cause harm (Carlsmith, 2006; Vidmar, 2000), and the more harm done by the offense (Vidmar, 2000), the greater the punishment that the transgressor is believed to deserve and, in turn, the more severe the punishment that is recommended for the transgressor.

The effect of these factors is mediated by the amount of moral outrage caused by the transgression (Carlsmith et al., 2002).

Researchers have proposed that the just-deserts motive is at least somewhat intuitive and universal (Darley, 2009). As evidence for this claim, neural imaging studies indicate that people experience rewarding brain states when they see a transgressor who has committed a serious offense being punished in proportion to the crime: People actually feel satisfied when they see a transgressor get his or her “just deserts” (see Darley, 2009). In addition, some authors suggest an evolutionary basis for the just-deserts motive (e.g., Robinson, Kurzban, & Jones, 2007). The motive likely provided various advantages in humans’ ancestral past, such as stability and predictability, and facilitation of cooperative or mutually beneficial exchanges (Robinson et al., 2007). These neurological and evolutionary explanations support the notion that the retribution motive is universal and intuitive.

In summary, similar to both equity theory and just-world theory, theory and research on retributive motivation for punishment suggest that people are concerned with ensuring that everyone gets what is deserved. People are driven by moral outrage to see that offenders get their just deserts, receiving a punishment that is proportional to their offense. This need to see that people get the punishment that they deserve is thought to be universal and intuitive, perhaps with an evolutionary basis.

Summary. In this section I reviewed several perspectives on the need to see that people get what they deserve. The theories differ in their assumptions and implications about the nature and origins of this need. The need to see that people get what is deserved can be seen as rooted in self-interest, a desire to maintain a belief in a just

world, and/or evolutionary mechanisms. Despite these varying perspectives, the theories all converge on the notion that people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviours in social situations will often be guided by what they believe individuals deserve.

Deservingness and Human Rights

In this section, I tie together the research on abstract versus specific responses and the need to see that people get what they deserve to argue the following. First, I argue that deservingness considerations are a contextual factor behind the toleration of specific human rights violations. Specifically, given the research suggesting a need to see that people get what they deserve, I expect people to tolerate specific human rights violations to the extent that the target is seen to deserve the treatment that violated the human right. Second, given research and theory suggesting that people do not take into account contextual factors (e.g., perceived deservingness of specific individuals) in forming abstract opinions, I expect many people to support universal human rights in the abstract, yet still to tolerate violations of those same rights in cases where the target was perceived to be deserving of treatment that violated a human right. I will discuss research relevant to each of the two parts of my argument in turn.

Deservingness and the toleration of human rights violations. Previous research indirectly supports the idea that perceived deservingness of specific individuals influences willingness to tolerate the violations of those individuals' human rights. These studies have noted that factors such as the perceived negative valence of the target's behaviour or character, including dehumanization of the target (e.g., believing that the target is like a wild animal because he or she committed a murder), can lead people to tolerate the violation of the target's rights (e.g., Carlsmith & Sood, 2009; Liberman,

2013; Viki, Osgood, & Phillips, 2013). According to Feather (1999, 2003) and others (e.g., Lerner, 1980), a precursor to perceived deservingness for negative outcomes (as in the case of a human rights violation) is that the individual is seen as having engaged in negative behaviour or as possessing negative characteristics. Thus, the aforementioned factors might have their effect on toleration of human rights violations through perceptions that the target deserves the treatment that violates his or her human rights. For example, if the target has committed some prior bad act, his or her behaviour will be viewed negatively. Note that research on the fundamental attribution error indicates that people often attribute the negative actions of others to their negative character (Ross, 1977); therefore, this individual will likely also be seen as possessing negative character. The negative evaluations of the individual's behaviour and character would lead people to believe that she or he deserves to be treated harshly; thus, people might tolerate treatment that violates the target's rights (e.g., the right to humane treatment). Given the evidence for a strong need to see that people get what they deserve, such a deservingness-mediated effect would not be surprising. However, the studies mentioned above do not test this account directly.

One example of research suggesting a link between perceived deservingness and toleration of human rights violations is that on retributive motivation and the treatment of suspected offenders. Researchers argue that the use of harsh interrogation techniques, including those that violate human rights (i.e., torture), tends to be associated with the desire to punish suspects for their past immoral behaviour or immoral character (Carlsmith & Sood, 2009; Liberman, 2013). Thus, although the techniques are often implemented under the guise of national security (i.e., the person needed to be tortured in

order to get the necessary information to avoid an attack) it appears that this is not the primary motivation. Carlsmith and Sood (2009), for example, found that people supported harsher interrogation techniques, including torture, based on the perceived morality of the suspect as suggested by his past activities. People also supported harsher punishment of the suspect for the same reason. Presumably, retributive punishment motives influenced the decision to use harsh interrogation techniques, such that cruel and inhumane treatment was acceptable when the suspect was seen as deserving of such treatment as punishment for prior misdeeds. The results of the study by Carlsmith and Sood (2009) are consistent with Liberman (2013), who found that people's endorsement of the use of torture was related to their overall tendency to seek retribution for past offenses. Those who strongly endorsed retributive punishments also tended to support harsh punishment of transgressor states and the harsh treatment of detainees (Liberman, 2013). Neither Carlsmith and Sood (2009) nor Liberman (2013), however, assessed perceived deservingness.

Research on dehumanization also suggests a link between perceived deservingness and toleration of human rights violations. Dehumanization occurs in different forms, one of which is to deny that certain individuals or groups possess uniquely human qualities (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Haslam, 2006; Leyens, Désert, Croizet, & Darcis, 2000). Viki et al. (2013) found that people were more willing to torture the individuals and group that they dehumanized, compared to those that they did not. Groups or individuals that are dehumanized tend to be seen as more blameworthy and immoral (Bastian et al., 2011), likely leading to the evaluation that they deserve to be punished or mistreated. The dehumanization studies suggest,

therefore, that people will support torture (a violation of an individual's human rights) due to a desire to punish suspects in accordance with what they are seen to deserve (e.g., because of their immoral character or behaviour). Again, however, perceived deservingness was not assessed.

In summary, previous research indirectly supports the idea that perceived deservingness of the targets of human rights violations influences people's willingness to tolerate those violations. In the current study, I looked *directly* at the role of perceived deservingness in the toleration of a human rights violation.

Deservingness and abstract versus specific support for human rights. For the first part of my thesis, I also examined whether people showed a discrepancy between their abstract support for a given human right and their willingness to tolerate specific violations of that human right, as well as whether this was due to deservingness concerns. The distinction of who deserves good or bad treatment is antithetical to what it means for human rights to be universal (see Hafer, 2011). Universal human rights are those that people cannot be denied based on any differentiating characteristics, including those that influence their perceived deservingness for good or bad treatment. Thus, if individuals support universal human rights, they should not tolerate violations of those rights, regardless of how deserving they perceive the target to be of treatment that violates his or her human rights. However, as already discussed, I propose that people will tolerate specific violations of human rights to the extent that the target is seen to deserve the treatment that violates the right in question. Given a tendency to ignore contextual factors when giving abstract opinions, I further argue that people will tolerate human

rights violations based on deservingness considerations, even when they endorse those universal human rights in an abstract sense.

Prior to my studies, no research had directly investigated the role that perceived deservingness plays in the discrepancy between abstract endorsement of universal human rights and toleration of specific violations of those rights. For example, in the research on torture described in the previous section, participants' abstract opinions about the right to humane treatment (United Nations, 2014a) were not assessed. Thus, it is unknown whether endorsing or tolerating a human rights violation (where the suspect was presumably deserving of such treatment) diverged from participants' abstract human rights attitudes, as I have proposed in this thesis.

The study by Staerklé and Clémence (2004) indirectly addressed the argument that I propose. As noted earlier, they found that participants generally supported certain universal human rights, but that this support did not necessarily correspond with the degree to which they felt specific violations of those human rights were unacceptable. Staerklé and Clémence reasoned that differences in participants' evaluations of the targets likely led participants to come to conclusions about the extent to which each of the targets deserved the treatment that violated his or her rights. Some participants then presumably based their judgments about the violation on deservingness considerations rather than on their abstract support for the universal human rights in question. However, this deservingness explanation was not tested directly. Staerklé and Clémence did not measure the perceived deservingness of the victim and their attempt to manipulate the perceived negativity of the victim's behaviour, presumably indicative of deservingness, was unsuccessful.

In summary, no previous research on human rights has tested whether perceived deservingness plays a role in the discrepancy between abstract endorsement of universal human rights and toleration of specific violations of those rights. I attempted to fill this gap in the current study.

The Current Study

For Part I of my thesis, I presented participants with two scenarios about the same human rights violation. Similar to Carlsmith and Sood (2009), the two scenarios varied in the moral reprehensibility of the targets' past transgression. I measured both toleration of the human rights violation and the perceived deservingness of the target. I predicted that there would be more toleration of the human rights violation when the target had committed a transgression that was high compared to low in moral reprehensibility (Hypothesis 1) and that this effect would be mediated by the target's perceived deservingness (Hypothesis 2). Additionally, before rating their reactions to the scenarios involving a human rights violation, I asked participants to rate their abstract endorsement of the specific right being violated. I predicted that the moral reprehensibility of the target's transgression would influence toleration of the human rights violations over and above participants' abstract endorsement of the relevant universal human right (Hypothesis 3). Also, I expected that some people would show a discrepancy, such that they would endorse the relevant universal human right in the abstract, but would tolerate at least one violation of that right (Hypothesis 4). Finally, I expected that the extent of participants' discrepancy would be greater for the high, compared to low, moral reprehensibility scenario (Hypothesis 5).

Summary

In summary, for the first part of my thesis I examined the problem of toleration of human rights violations. Specifically, I explored whether deservingness considerations, based on the moral reprehensibility of a target's past transgression, lead people to tolerate violations of the target's rights. I also examined whether the moral reprehensibility of a target's past behaviour predicts toleration over and above people's abstract attitudes toward the human right being violated. Finally, I explored whether people show a discrepancy between their abstract attitudes toward a given right and their responses to specific violations of that right; and, if so, whether the influence of deservingness considerations accounts for this discrepancy. Although previous studies have investigated conditions under which people tolerate human rights violations, these studies do not directly examine the role of perceived deservingness. Part I of my thesis fills this gap by directly exploring the role of the target's perceived deservingness on the toleration of human rights violations.

Part II: A Possible Solution

As explained earlier, I expect that many people will show a discrepancy in their human rights attitudes, such that they will be supportive of a given human right in the abstract yet tolerate a violation of that human right in specific cases (perhaps due to deservingness considerations). If there are situations in which it is deemed appropriate or tolerable to deny a person his or her human rights, then human rights are not deemed applicable to everyone, undermining the idea of *universal* human rights.

I take the position that universal human rights are desirable (for debate on this topic, see Donnelly, 2003). For this reason, I believe it is important to understand how to

reduce the discrepancy between abstract support for human rights and responses in specific situations in such a way that reduces the toleration of human rights violations. Therefore, for Part II of my thesis, I attempted to change how people respond to a human rights violation, to make their responses more consistent with their abstract endorsement of the human right in question. The technique I explored was called “hypocrisy induction.” In this section of the Introduction, I summarize current research on hypocrisy induction as well as explain how I used this procedure in an attempt to make people less tolerant of a human rights violation.

Hypocrisy Induction and Reducing Toleration of Human Rights Violations

One potential way to get people to act on their abstract endorsement of universal human rights, rather than on perceived deservingness of the target, is through inducing hypocrisy. The hypocrisy induction technique involves getting people to privately recognize their previous actions that are not consistent with their publicly expressed attitude or position. Recognizing their hypocrisy makes people uncomfortable, leading them to change their behaviour in order for it to be more in line with their publicly expressed attitude or position (Stone & Fernandez, 2008).

The hypocrisy induction procedure is based on the cognitive dissonance paradigm (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). In the original cognitive dissonance model, a discrepancy between two cognitive elements, for example two attitudes or an attitude and behaviour, leads to a state of negative arousal, called “psychological dissonance.” In the initial study by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), participants were asked to perform a boring task and then tell another student that they enjoyed it. They were paid \$20, \$1, or nothing (control condition). As the task was not enjoyable, participants were expressing an attitude that

was not consistent with how they actually felt. The dissonance resulting from the conflict between expressed and actual attitudes was greatest in the \$1 condition, where the compensation was not enough to justify expressing the false attitude. Participants in the \$20 condition likely felt that the money was enough motivation to express the false attitude, hence doing so did not arouse any dissonance. Participants in the \$1 condition were motivated to relieve the dissonance aroused by expressing an attitude that was counter to how they really felt. In support of this reasoning, participants in the \$1 condition were more likely to say that they would like to participate in a similar study in the future compared to participants in the other two conditions. Presumably, the former were able to convince themselves that the task actually was relatively enjoyable. These results suggest that, without enough outside motivation (e.g., getting paid a meaningful amount of money), expressing an attitude, or potentially a behaviour, that is inconsistent with the person's actual attitude arouses dissonance, which motivates the person to adjust his or her actual attitude to fit the expressed attitude or behaviour.

Unlike in the original experiment, where participants adjusted their attitudes to reduce the dissonance, hypocrisy induction involves participants realizing the discrepancy between a strongly held attitude and their behaviour—that is, recognizing their hypocrisy—which leads them to adjust the behaviour to be more in line with their attitude (Stone & Fernandez, 2008). Participants are first asked to publicly advocate in favour of their strongly held attitude, then they are asked to reflect on times when they have not lived up to their advocated standard (Stone & Fernandez, 2008). Because it is possible to reduce the discrepancy either by changing the attitude or the behaviour, making sure that participants feel strongly about their position ensures that the attitude is

more resistant to change (Sherman & Gorkin, 1980). Thus participants will change the behaviour to be more in line with the attitude, and not the other way around. So far, hypocrisy induction has mainly been used to promote positive health behaviour (e.g., condom use; Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone et al., 1997) and to encourage environmentally friendly practices (e.g., conserving electricity; Kantola et al., 1984). For example, in the study by Stone and colleagues (1997), participants were asked to publically advocate for using condoms by being filmed while making a speech about the importance of using condoms. Then, participants were told to reflect on times when they had failed to use condoms, under the pretence that they were helping to identify excuses that people might use when they fail to use condoms. After privately recognizing their hypocrisy, participants were given the opportunity to reduce the discrepancy by either buying condoms and/or donating to a homeless shelter (to at least improve their self-image). When given the opportunity, most participants chose to reduce the dissonance directly by purchasing condoms. Similar to these studies, I tried to induce hypocrisy by getting participants to first publicly advocate their abstract support for a given human right, and then focus on the discrepancy between their advocated position and their previous toleration of a specific violation of that right. Assuming that people strongly endorse the relevant human right in the abstract, I expected the hypocrisy induction procedure to lead to decreased toleration of violations of that right (and not a change in general endorsement of the right).

The Current Study

In Part II of the current study, I examined whether hypocrisy induction would be an effective method for reducing the toleration of a human rights violation. My

hypocrisy induction experiment was slightly different from most previous experiments in this field. In many previous studies, the researchers were able to assume that their participants were already in favour of whatever attitude they were advocating and that they had likely acted in ways that went against this position at some point in the past. For example, given the social desirability of using condoms, Stone et al. (1997) could assume that their student participants would strongly endorse this practice. Yet, given that it is not unusual for people to occasionally neglect to use condoms, Stone et al. (1997) could also assume that many of their participants would also be able to recall a time when they had not used condoms. Thus these authors could assume that participants would be inconsistent between their expressed position and their actual behaviour, giving the hypocrisy induction procedure the chance to be effective.

For the current study, unlike the hypocrisy induction studies discussed previously, it was less clear whether or not most participants would (1) strongly endorse the human right in question and (2) be able to recall times when they acted in ways that were inconsistent with their support for this human right. However, for the first part of my study, I assessed participants' abstract support for a universal human right, as well as their reactions to specific violations of that right; assessing these constructs in Part I provided some participants with a recent example of a time when they were hypocritical. Then in Part II, participants were randomly assigned to either the hypocrisy or control conditions, as in the Stone et al. (1997) and other similar experiments. Participants in the hypocrisy induction condition were given the opportunity to recognize any discrepancy that might exist between their support for the human right in general and their toleration of violations of that right in specific situations, as assessed in Part I of the study. All

participants were then given the opportunity to act in a way that was consistent with their overall support for the relevant human right. Only those who supported the human right in the abstract were retained for analysis in Part II, as the hypocrisy induction procedure is irrelevant for participants who did not support the relevant human right in the abstract. Retaining only participants for whom the procedure is relevant has been used in similar hypocrisy induction experiments (see Son Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002). I hypothesized that participants in the hypocrisy induction condition would respond in a way that expressed less toleration for the human rights violations relative to the control group (Hypothesis 6).

Summary

For the second part of my thesis, I explored one possible solution to the toleration of human rights violations. Given that people show a discrepancy between their abstract support for certain human rights and their toleration of specific violations of those human rights, I reasoned that hypocrisy induction would reduce this toleration. The hypocrisy induction procedure involves having participants advocate a position, then privately recall times in which they did not live up to that position (i.e., a time when they behaved hypocritically). Recognizing their hypocrisy creates a state of psychological dissonance, which participants are motivated to reduce by changing their behaviour to be more consistent with their advocated position. Although this procedure had been used in previous experiments to promote positive health behaviours and environmentally friendly practices, until the present study, it had not been used in the context of human rights.

Hypotheses

The UDHR specifies that everyone is entitled to humane treatment and not to be tortured (United Nations, 2014a). For both parts of my thesis, I chose to focus on support for and toleration of violations of this particular right.

Part I

For the first part of my thesis, participants answered questions about their abstract support for the right to humane treatment (among other items), and then gave their reactions to scenarios about specific violations of this right. The moral reprehensibility of the target's past transgression was varied. Based on research suggesting that people have a need to see that individuals get what they deserve, as well as research on human rights violations, I hypothesized the following.

Hypothesis 1: There would be more toleration of the rights violation when the target committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression compared to when the target committed a less morally reprehensible transgression.

Hypothesis 2: The effect of the moral reprehensibility of the target's transgression would be mediated by his perceived deservingness. Deservingness was examined as a mediator because the effect of the target's moral reprehensibility on the toleration of the target's torture was expected to work through deservingness judgments.

Specifically, I expected that, when the target committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression, participants would see him as more deserving of the treatment that violated his rights, and, therefore, would show greater toleration for the violation.

Based on research suggesting a tendency for people to ignore contextual factors when forming abstract opinions (resulting in a discrepancy between their abstract opinions and situation-specific reactions), I hypothesized the following.

Hypothesis 3: The effect of the moral reprehensibility of the target's transgression on the toleration of a human rights violation (i.e., Hypothesis 1) would hold over and above participants' previously reported attitudes about the right to humane treatment.

Hypothesis 4: Some participants would show a discrepancy between their abstract support for the right to humane treatment and their toleration of a specific violation of that right, such that they would express support for the right to humane treatment in the abstract, but tolerate the violation of this right in at least one of the scenarios.

Hypothesis 5: The extent to which participants were discrepant would be greater for the high, compared to low, moral reprehensibility scenario.

Part II

For the second part of my thesis, participants were assigned to either a hypocrisy induction or control condition in which they were asked about the human rights scenario on which they were the most discrepant in Part I. Then, along with other measures, all participants completed similar response items for the same human rights scenarios from Part I. Before being debriefed, participants also had the opportunity to ask for further information on universal human rights. Based on the hypocrisy induction literature, I hypothesized the following.

Hypothesis 6a: Among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would become less tolerant

of the torture (when asked to respond to the same scenario again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.

Hypothesis 6b: Among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would be more willing to help the target of the human rights violation (when asked to respond to the same scenario again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.

Hypothesis 6c: Among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would be more likely to ask for additional information about supporting human rights if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.

Method

This study consisted of one session divided into two parts. For the first part of the study, I looked at individuals' abstract opinions about universal human rights and their willingness to tolerate a human rights violation. Specifically, I looked at participants' abstract opinion about the right to protection against torture (i.e., the right to humane treatment) and their willingness to tolerate a specific case of torture. For the second part of the study, I looked at whether or not hypocrisy induction is an effective way to make participants less tolerant of the human rights violation, thus making their situation-specific responses more consistent with their abstract support for the particular right in question.

Participants

I recruited 223 Brock University students (197 female, 26 male) for this study using the university's Psychology Research Pool website (SONA).¹ Participants' ages ranged from 18 to 55 years ($M = 19.46$, $SD = 3.80$). The students signed up for a study on "Personal Opinions about Current Events and a Writing Task," and received course credit for their participation. Most participants were run alone, but 38 participants were run simultaneously, 2 or 3 at a time. Those participants who completed the study in groups completed the tasks in separate, private computer stations.

Similar to the organization of the introduction, the remainder of this section has been broken into two main parts. The first part involves the role of deservingness in tolerating human rights violations, as well as the discrepancy between abstract support for a human right and the toleration of specific violations of that right. The second part

¹ Two participants asked to have their data removed from the dataset. Their data were not analyzed and these participants were not included in the reported sample size.

involves decreasing toleration of specific human rights violations through hypocrisy induction. Figure 1 presents a visual overview of the procedure. Each step of this procedure will be explained in detail in subsequent sections.

Part I

Procedure and manipulation. The first part of this study involved testing Hypotheses 1 through 5. That is, this portion of the procedure allowed me to test my hypotheses regarding the tendency for individuals to base their reactions to human rights violations on deservingness considerations, and for these reactions to be at odds with their abstract endorsement of human rights.

The researcher first told participants that there would be two studies taking place during the session, so they had to sign one consent form for the first study and another form, part way through the session, for the second study (see Appendix A). The rest of the procedure for Part I was completed on the computer, using Qualtrics. After signing the first consent form, the experimenter showed students their participant ID number and then recorded it in a log. Participants were told that this ID would be used to record if any computer malfunctions took place during the session. The actual reason for the participant ID was to connect their responses on the surveys to the behavioural measure at the end of the study.

Participants then filled out the demographics form (see Appendix B), followed by measures of individual differences in right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996; see Appendix C), social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; see Appendix D) and preference for consistency (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995; see




Figure 1. Overview of the procedure for the current study. Participants responded to the same items after the scenarios for both Parts I and II, with the addition of the behavioural intention items for Part II.

Appendix E). The individual differences were included as exploratory moderator variables. None of the tentative hypotheses including these variables were supported; thus, they will not be mentioned further (except in footnotes). Additionally, participants indicated their abstract support for human rights in general and the right to humane treatment (see Appendix C). The items about support for human rights were hidden in the right-wing authoritarianism scale in order to conceal the fact that I was interested in the discrepancy between their abstract endorsement of human rights and how they responded to the human rights scenarios.

After responding to these measures, participants read six scenarios (see Appendix F). Participants were told that all of the scenarios were based on actual news stories. Two of these scenarios depicted torture during an interrogation (a violation of the right to humane treatment) and the other four were filler scenarios (two about a forest fire and two about a car accident). The two scenarios for the human rights violation varied in the moral reprehensibility of the target's past transgression; one involving a target who committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression and one where the target had committed a less morally reprehensible transgression. Thus, the moral reprehensibility manipulation was within-subjects. Aside from the manipulation, the two scenarios involved the same sequence of events, differing only in the order of some of the words as well as the names of the characters.

The scenarios about torture were based on the scenario used by Carlsmith and Sood (2009). In each of these scenarios, participants read about an Afghani man (either Farid or Sahad) who was detained while working near an insurgent encampment. The man was interrogated based on the suspicion that he might have overheard some useful

information, and the interrogation involved torture. Participants were also told that the man had been involved with an extremist group when he was a teenager, but that he had not been in contact with the group for several years. For the current study, the moral reprehensibility of the target's past actions differed based on what the target had done while he was involved with the extremist group. In the high moral reprehensibility scenario, the target had sniped four school children in order to create a distraction during an attack. In the low moral reprehensibility scenario, the target had injured four soldiers during an ambush. It is important to note that the interrogation in both scenarios was not related to the target's past actions. Moreover, both scenarios indicated that the target repeatedly said that he did not have any information on terrorist activities.

The four filler scenarios were also about serious situations, but did not deal with human rights violations. The order of the scenarios was counterbalanced, such that participants were randomly assigned to one of four different orders. The four orders that were used can be seen in Figure 2. The torture scenarios were always shown second and fifth. Scenarios about the same issue did not appear consecutively.

Following each of the human rights scenarios, participants answered a few questions about their perceptions of the target and the rights violation. These questions included measures of toleration of the rights violation, how deserving the target was perceived to be of harsh treatment, and the perceived morality of the target and his past behaviour (see Appendix G). Similar questions followed the filler scenarios, though these were not analyzed (see Appendix H). Finally, participants filled out an attention check that asked them to identify the highest value from a list of four numbers (see Appendix I).




Figure 2. The four different orders of scenarios in Part I.

Dependent measures.

Toleration items (Cronbach's $\alpha = .88$ [low moral reprehensibility scenario], Cronbach's $\alpha = .85$ [high moral reprehensibility scenario]). Three items assessed the extent to which the participants tolerated the human rights violation described in the scenario (e.g., "The severity of the treatment was appropriate"). Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with each statement from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). High scores on the composite variable indicated high toleration (see Appendix G).

Deservingness items ($r = .53$ [low moral reprehensibility scenario], $r = .65$ [high moral reprehensibility scenario]). Two items assessed the degree to which participants perceived that the target deserved the treatment that he received in the scenario (e.g.,

“Farid deserved treatment that was this severe”). Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with each statement from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). High scores on the composite variable indicated high perceived deservingness (see Appendix G).²

Manipulation check.

Morality items (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .79$ [low moral reprehensibility scenario], Cronbach’s $\alpha = .82$ [high moral reprehensibility scenario]). After the dependent variables, four items assessed the perceived morality of the target and his behaviour (e.g., “To what extent do you think Farid is a good or bad person?”). These served as a check for the moral reprehensibility manipulation. Participants rated the items from 1 (*very bad/immoral*) to 7 (*very good/moral*). High scores on the composite variable indicated high perceived morality (see Appendix G).

Other variables.

Support for the right to humane treatment. One item assessed participants’ abstract support for the right to humane treatment (“No one should ever be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment for any reason”). Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with this statement from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). High scores indicated high support for the right to humane treatment (see Appendix C).

Support for universal human rights in general. For exploratory purposes, there was one item assessing participants’ abstract support for universal human rights in general (“Human rights should be universal, meaning they are granted to everyone [e.g.,

² Originally there were three items assessing deservingness. One of the items was dropped (“[Farid/Sahad] deserved to be tortured.”) because it correlated too highly with the toleration items, $r = .882$, and thus was not deemed sufficiently different from toleration.

regardless of race, gender, behaviour, sexual orientation]”). Participants rated the extent to which they agreed with this statement from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). High scores indicated high support for human rights in general (see Appendix C).

Likelihood of having information item. One item assessed how likely participants thought it was that the target had important information about terrorist activities (see Appendix G). Participants used a scale ranging from 0% (*no chance*) to 100% (*definitely*). I thought that this variable could be an additional, more utilitarian, mediator of the relation between moral reprehensibility and toleration, aside from perceived deservingness. This variable was exploratory; thus, it is not reflected in the hypotheses.

Attention check. For this item, participants were shown a list of four values and asked to select the highest value. The first two values were calculated by adding the values for participants’ responses to the abstract support for humane treatment item and the average of their responses on the three toleration items (e.g., if the participant selected 4 on the abstract support for humane treatment item and had an average score of 5 for the three toleration items, then their score would be 9). These values can be seen as “discrepancy scores” because they represent the magnitude of the disagreement between participants’ abstract support for the right to humane treatment and toleration of torture. Because participants gave toleration ratings for each of the two scenarios involving torture, a discrepancy score was calculated for each of these scenarios. High discrepancy scores indicated a large discrepancy between participants’ abstract support for humane treatment and their toleration of torture in a scenario. The first value that participants could choose was their discrepancy score for the low moral reprehensibility scenario.

The second value that participants could choose was their discrepancy score for the high moral reprehensibility scenario. The third and fourth values that participants could select were their discrepancy scores for the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios minus one (e.g., if the discrepancy score for the low moral reprehensibility scenario was 8, then the third option would have been 7).

The higher of the first two options indicated on which scenario the participant was the most discrepant. When the participant clicked on the highest value, the survey then selected the appropriate materials for Part II; that is, for those in the hypocrisy condition, the survey was programmed to show the materials related to the torture scenario on which the participant was the most discrepant. Thus, the response to this question selected the materials that the participant saw for Part II. The materials for Part II will be explained in detail in the next section.

Additionally, this item was used as an attention check. If participants did not select the highest value, it indicated that they were not paying attention and that their responses might not be valid.

Part II

Procedure and manipulation. The second part of this study involved testing Hypotheses 6a to 6c. That is, this portion of the procedure allowed me to test my hypotheses regarding hypocrisy induction.

The scenario on which a participant showed the greatest discrepancy was the scenario that was used for that participant in the second part of the study (for most people, this was expected to be the scenario in which the target committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression). Directly after finishing the attention

check/discrepancy score item, participants were brought to a screen that alerted them that they had completed Study 1 and needed to contact the researcher, who would enter a password to begin Study 2. At this point, the researcher gave participants the second informed consent form (see Appendix A) for what participants were told was a different project on emotions and persuasive writing style.

Once the participant signed the informed consent form, the researcher entered the password and the participant began the next task. The rest of the procedure for Part II was administered on the computer via Qualtrics, with the exception of the behavioural measure (which is explained later on in this section). The next screen explained the writing task to the participants (see Appendix J). These instructions were the start of the hypocrisy induction procedure. The survey software randomly assigned participants to either the hypocrisy or control condition, thus keeping the researcher blind to participants' conditions. Similar to Son Hing et al. (2002), participants were told on the instruction screen that they were completing a study on emotions and persuasive writing. The instructions explained that their topic for the persuasive writing task was to explain why they believed it was important to support the right to humane treatment. Additionally, they were told that selected excerpts from some of the essays would be used in promotional materials on campus. Thus, this first writing task served as participants' public endorsement of the right to humane treatment. Participants in the control condition only completed the first writing task. That is, they only wrote about why it was important to support the right to humane treatment. Participants in the hypocrisy induction condition, however, completed an extension of the writing task, which is explained in the following section.

Hypocrisy induction. After advocating their support for human rights in the first writing task, the next screen for participants in the hypocrisy induction condition said, “To get a better understanding of how people think about human rights, we have an additional question about your thoughts and opinions related to human rights.” Participants were told that the researcher was interested in understanding why people might be conflicted about supporting human rights and, for this reason, they were asked to write a second part of the essay. The instructions for this task read,

In order to help you think of an example of when you might feel conflicted about supporting this right, we have chosen one of the scenarios related to human rights from the previous study for you to use to come up with ideas. The scenario and your responses are displayed below.

In order to make some of the participants feel hypocritical, specifically those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios, the screen displayed the scenario on which participants were most discrepant as well as the associated responses. Participants had to scroll past the original responses in order to begin writing. See Appendix K for the complete instructions.

Both conditions. After completing the writing task, all participants filled out the affect measure used in the Son Hing et al. (2002) hypocrisy induction study (originally used in Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; see Appendix L). This measure allowed me to see whether or not participants in the hypocrisy condition were experiencing the emotions associated with dissonance arousal.

After the participants completed the affect measure, they pressed “Submit” and were taken to a screen that looked identical to the actual Qualtrics submit screen. Above

the loading bar they saw a message that said, “Please wait while your responses are validated. This should only take a moment.” After three seconds the screen automatically went to the next page where an alert box displayed an error message. The message informed participants that several questions, images, or text were not displayed correctly. After clicking “OK” on the error message, the instructions on the screen told participants to contact the researcher for assistance. The researcher then asked participants to please complete the pages again. The researcher also explained to participants that it was important that their responses were genuine, otherwise it might interfere with the results. For this reason, participants were told to respond based on how they felt at that time, rather than trying to recall their previous responses. Participants were told that their current responses would replace those that they previously entered. See Appendix M for the submit screen and the full error message that was displayed.

Next, participants were asked to re-read two of the human rights scenarios and two of the filler scenarios from Part I. They also answered the same response items as in Part I of the study, but with a couple of added behavioural intention items (see Appendix N). Because the four filler scenarios were not important to the research question, participants only read and responded to two of the filler scenarios instead of all four. Participants were shown more than just the torture scenarios to help avoid suspicion, in that participants could have started to guess at the purpose of the study if they were shown only one particular type of scenario multiple times.

Once participants finished with the scenarios and response items, the submit page told them to tell the researcher that they were finished. Before starting the debriefing, the researcher gave participants a slip of paper and told them that if they wanted more

information on universal human rights and how they could help promote such rights, they could write their email down on the slip of paper and drop it in a box near the door before being debriefed. The slips of paper had a small number written on one of the corners, which the researcher wrote down in the log next to the participant ID before giving it to the participant. The number was written before the session began, when the participant was not present. Whether participants sought out further information on human rights was used as a behavioural indicator of the effectiveness of the hypocrisy procedure. Finally, the participants were verbally debriefed (see Appendix O) and then asked to re-consent (see Appendix P) to having their data included in the study. Before leaving, participants were given a printed debriefing form (see Appendix Q).

Dependent measures.

Scenario response items. The items used to measure the toleration of the violation ($\alpha = .88$ [low moral reprehensibility scenario], $\alpha = .92$ [high moral reprehensibility scenario]), perceived deservingness ($r = .59$ [low moral reprehensibility scenario], $r = .67$ [high moral reprehensibility scenario]), and perceived morality ($\alpha = .84$ [low moral reprehensibility scenario], $\alpha = .85$ [high moral reprehensibility scenario]) were all the same as those used in Part I of this study. See Appendix G for the complete items.

Behavioural intention items ($r = .69$ [low moral reprehensibility scenario], $r = .66$ [high moral reprehensibility scenario]). These two items assessed how participants intended to behave with regards to the rights violation from the scenario (e.g., “If Farid’s case were brought to trial, how willing would you be to make a donation to help cover his legal fees?”). Participants rated the extent to which they were willing to

behave in a way that favoured the target of the human rights violation from 1 (*not at all willing*) to 9 (*completely willing*). High scores on the composite variable indicated high willingness to help the target. See Appendix N for the complete list of these items.

Behavioural measure. Whether or not a participant asked to be emailed further information about human rights was used to test the effect of the hypocrisy induction procedure on the participant's behaviour. This measure was coded as 1 if the participant requested further information and 0 if the participant did not request further information.

Manipulation check.

Affect measure (Monteith et al., 1993, Cronbach's $\alpha = .92$). Participants rated the extent to which each of 29 emotions described their state after the essay task, using a scale ranging from 1 (*does not apply at all*) to 7 (*applies very much*). The 14 items from the Negative Emotions Toward the Self and Discomfort subscales were averaged to create a composite measure of negative arousal. High scores indicated greater negative arousal. The other subscales were not analyzed, as they were not relevant to the study. See Appendix L for the complete measure.

Experimental Design and Data Analysis

This section provides detailed explanations of the analysis methods used in the current study. The information is organized by Part I and Part II, as well as by hypothesis.

Part I.

Hypothesis 1. I expected that participants would tolerate the torture more when the target had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression compared to when the target committed a less morally reprehensible transgression. To analyze the results

for this hypothesis, I used a paired-samples t test with toleration as the dependent variable and the moral reprehensibility of the target's behaviour as the within-subjects independent variable.

Hypothesis 2. I expected that the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on toleration would be mediated by the degree to which participants thought the target was deserving of harsh treatment. To analyze the results for this hypothesis, I used the method for testing within-subjects mediation described by Judd, Kenny, and McClelland (2001).

In a between-subjects mediation model, the independent variable indirectly affects the dependent variable through a mediator variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986).³ To show evidence of between-subjects mediation, the researcher must establish that (1) the independent variable predicts the dependent variable, (2) the independent variable predicts the mediator variable, (3) the mediator predicts the dependent variable, and (4) the relation between the independent variable and the dependent variable is no longer significant or is significantly reduced after accounting for the mediator variable. Similarly, in the within-subjects mediation analysis described by Judd et al. (2001), a within-subjects independent variable indirectly causes differences in the dependent variable by first causing differences in a mediator variable. Additionally, this method involves testing whether subject-level differences in the proposed mediator variable moderate the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Similar to between-subjects mediation analysis, within-subjects mediation is examined using

³ For the purpose of clarity in this explanation, I am referring to the predictor variable in a mediation model as the independent variable and the outcome variable as the dependent variable.

several steps that test each path in the mediation model. The conceptual mediation model that is tested using this method is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3. The conceptual within-subjects mediation model. Paths are labelled according to the step in which they are tested.

Step 1 in this method establishes that the independent variable predicts the dependent variable. This can be shown using a paired-samples t test. Step 2 establishes that the independent variable predicts the mediator variable. Like in Step 1, this can be shown using a paired-samples t test.

In Step 3, the mediator is shown to predict the dependent variable. The three components involved in establishing this relationship when there are two experimental conditions (as in the present study) are as follows: (i) the mediator variable must predict the dependent variable for the first condition, (ii) the mediator variable must predict the dependent variable for the second condition, and (iii) within-subject differences in the mediator must predict within-subjects differences in the dependent variable (Figure 4 shows a conceptual model of these components).




Figure 4. The three components of Step 3 for within-subjects mediation analysis.

The first two components can be tested by regressing the dependent variable onto the mediator variable within each level of the independent variable separately. The third component involves first creating difference scores for the mediator and dependent variable. These scores represent the within-subject differences in the mediator and dependent variable between the levels of the independent variable. In order to show that within-subject differences in the mediator predict within-subject differences in the dependent variable, the differences in the dependent variable are regressed onto differences in the mediator. If the mediator does predict the dependent variable within each level of the independent variable, and within-subjects differences in the mediator predict within-subjects differences in the dependent variable, then either partial or full mediation is present.

Before determining whether full or partial mediation has occurred, in Step 4, the researcher examines whether stable, subject-level differences in the proposed mediator moderate the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Subject-level differences represent participants' overall scores on a particular variable, outside of the within-subjects effect of condition (e.g., some participants will have higher scores on the

mediator compared to other participants, regardless of condition). It is possible that stable, subject-level differences in the proposed mediator interact with the independent variable to predict the dependent variable. That is, the proposed mediator could also be a moderator of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. To examine whether moderation is present, a final regression analysis is conducted (see Figure 5). For this analysis, the researcher first computes a subject-level score for the proposed mediator, which is done by calculating the sum of the scores for the mediator across each level of the independent variable (i.e., for each participant, add the score for the first condition to the score for the second condition). The summed scores are then centred. The within-subjects differences in the dependent variable are regressed onto within-subject differences in the mediator and the centred sum for the mediator variable. If the centred sum significantly predicts the dependent variable, then moderation is present.

Finally, in Step 5, the statistical significance of the intercept in the final regression equation, as described at the end of the previous paragraph and in Figure 5, is examined to determine whether full or partial mediation is present. The intercept represents the average within-subject difference in the dependent variable between the two conditions of the independent variable. If the intercept is significantly different from zero, the independent variable still significantly predicts the dependent variable after accounting for both within-subject differences in the mediator and the centred sum of the proposed mediator. If within-subject differences in the mediator significantly predict within-subject differences in the dependent variable and the intercept is *not* significantly different from zero, then full mediation is present. If within-subject differences in the

mediator significantly predict within-subject differences in the dependent variable and the intercept *is* significantly different from zero, then partial mediation is present.




Figure 5. The within-subjects mediation model tested in the final regression equation. The equation includes labels that correspond to those in the conceptual model.

For Hypothesis 2 of the present study, the within-subjects independent variable was the moral reprehensibility of the target's past behaviour. The within-subjects mediator variable was the perceived deservingness of the target for harsh treatment. The within-subjects dependent variable was the toleration of the target's torture in an interrogation. Figure 6 shows the conceptual model being tested for Hypothesis 2 in terms of the specific study variables.




Figure 6. The conceptual model being tested in Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3. I hypothesized that the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on the toleration of torture would hold over and above participants' expressed support for the right to humane treatment. That is, I expected that differences in participants' toleration of the torture in the two scenarios would not be dependent on their abstract support for the right to humane treatment. If participants were focusing on their abstract attitude toward the right to humane treatment (i.e., which expressed agreement that *no one* should ever be tortured) then they should not have tolerated the torture more when the target committed the more reprehensible transgression. However, if participants were tolerating the torture over and above their abstract support for the right to humane treatment, then, although those higher in abstract support for the right to humane treatment might tolerate the torture less overall, the differences in their toleration between the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios should be comparable to those lower in abstract support for the right to humane treatment. In summary, if participants tolerated the torture based on the moral reprehensibility of the target's past actions over and above their abstract support for humane treatment, then the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on the toleration of torture should not be moderated by

abstract support for the right to humane treatment. To examine whether this was the case, I used the method described by Judd et al. (2001) for examining an individual difference moderator of a within-subjects experimental effect.

According to Judd et al. (2001), there are two possible ways in which an individual difference variable can have an effect on a within-subjects variable. The first type of effect is referred to as “parallel functions,” where the slopes for the effect of the individual difference variable on the dependent variable in each level of the independent variable are parallel to one another. Parallel slopes indicate that the effect of the individual difference variable does not significantly differ depending on condition (see Figure 7). This effect indicates that there is a consistent main effect of the individual difference variable on the within-subjects dependent variable, but that it does not interact with the effect of the independent variable.




Figure 7. Example graph of parallel functions. This figure shows that the individual difference variable has a consistent main effect on the dependent variable, and that this effect does not differ based on condition.

The second type of effect is referred to as “nonparallel functions,” where the slopes for the effect of the individual difference variable on the dependent variable in each level of the independent variable are not parallel (see Figure 8). Nonparallel slopes indicate that the individual difference variable moderates the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. Judd et al.’s (2001) method for examining an individual difference moderator of a within-subjects effect is used to determine whether or not the slopes for the effect of the individual difference variable on the within-subject dependent variable in each level of the independent variable are parallel. The details of this method are described in the following paragraphs.




Figure 8. Example graph of nonparallel functions. This figure shows that the effect of the individual difference variable on the dependent variable differs based on condition.

In between-subjects moderation, the moderator variable affects the dependent variable by interacting with the independent variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Testing between-subjects moderation involves first testing the main effects of the independent and moderator variables on the dependent variable, then testing the interaction effect of

the independent and moderator variables on the dependent variable. Similarly, the within-subjects moderation analysis described by Judd et al. (2001) involves first examining the main effects of the within-subjects independent variable and the potential moderator variable (i.e., the individual difference variable) on the within-subjects dependent variable, then examining the interaction effect of the within-subjects independent variable and the potential moderator variable on within-subject differences in the dependent variable. The conceptual moderation model that is being tested using this method is shown in Figure 9.




Figure 9. The conceptual within-subjects moderation model. Paths are labelled according to the step on which they are tested. Steps 2 and 3 test the main effects of the moderator variable on the dependent variable for each condition; thus, separate models for these steps are shown at the bottom of the figure.

The first step in this method establishes that there is an effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. As in the method for within-subjects mediation, this effect can be tested using a paired-samples t test. The second step establishes that there is a main effect of the potential moderator variable on the dependent variable in the first condition. The third step establishes that there is a main effect of the potential moderator

variable on the dependent variable in the second condition. The second and third steps for this method are both tested using regression; for each condition, the dependent variable is regressed onto the potential moderator variable.

Finally, the fourth step establishes whether the potential moderator variable interacts with the independent variable to predict within-subject differences in the dependent variable. This is done in a final regression analysis where within-subject differences in the dependent variable are regressed onto the potential moderator variable. Figure 10 shows the conceptual model being tested by the final regression equation.




Figure 10. The within-subjects moderation model tested by the final regression equation. The equation at the bottom of the figure includes labels that correspond to those in the conceptual model.

If the potential moderator variable significantly predicts differences in the dependent variable, then the effect of the potential moderator variable on the dependent variable depends on the condition and, therefore, moderation is present. This effect indicates that the slopes of the lines for each level of the independent variable are not parallel. If there is a consistent main effect of the individual difference variable on each level of the dependent variable (as tested in the second and third steps), but moderation is

not present, then the slopes of the lines for each level of the independent variable are parallel.

For Hypothesis 3 in the present study, the within-subjects independent variable was the moral reprehensibility of the target's past behaviour. The potential moderator variable was participants' abstract support for the right to humane treatment. The within-subjects dependent variable was the toleration of the target's torture in an interrogation. If participants tolerated the use of torture based on the moral reprehensibility of the target's transgression over and above their abstract support for the right to humane treatment, then abstract support for humane treatment should not moderate the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation. Additionally, if moderation was not present, I expected the slopes for the effect of abstract support for humane treatment on toleration in each of the scenarios to be parallel. Figure 11 shows the conceptual model being tested for this hypothesis.




Figure 11. The conceptual model being tested in Hypothesis 3.

Hypothesis 4. I expected that some participants would show a discrepancy between their abstract support for the right to humane treatment and their toleration of a specific violation of that right. Namely, I expected some participants to express support for humane treatment in the abstract, but tolerate at least one of the specific violations of this right presented in the scenarios.

In the current study, participants were considered to be “discrepant” if they supported the right to humane treatment in the abstract, but tolerated the use of torture in at least one of the scenarios. Supporting the right to humane treatment in the abstract was operationalized as a rating of more than 4 (*neutral*) for the item that asked participants the extent to which they agreed or disagreed that everyone should be treated humanely and no one should be tortured. Tolerating the torture was operationalized as a toleration composite score of greater than or equal to 4 (*neutral*) for at least one of the torture scenarios. Thus, participants who were identified as discrepant were those who agreed with the right to humane treatment in the abstract, but reported neutral or supportive attitudes toward the torture in at least one of the torture scenarios.

I tested Hypothesis 4 by examining the frequency of participants who were discrepant for each of the torture scenarios and the overall number of participants who were discrepant on at least one of the scenarios. Note that this test involves only descriptive, and not inferential, statistics.

Hypothesis 5. I hypothesized that the extent to which participants were discrepant would be greater for the high, compared to the low, moral reprehensibility scenario. I tested this hypothesis using a paired-samples *t* test with moral reprehensibility as the within-subjects independent variable and the magnitude of discrepancy between abstract support for humane treatment and toleration of torture as the dependent variable.

The magnitude of discrepancy was computed by first reverse scoring participants’ average toleration in each of the scenarios, such that higher average scores for toleration indicated low support for humane treatment in specific scenarios (e.g., if a participant’s average toleration score was 7, the reverse-coded score indicating his or her situation-

specific support for humane treatment would be 1). Next, participants' scores for situation-specific support for humane treatment for each scenario were subtracted from their abstract support for humane treatment scores. Scores close to zero indicated consistency between abstract and situation-specific support for humane treatment. Positive scores indicated greater abstract support than situation-specific support for humane treatment, and vice versa for negative scores. Because there was no basis for interpreting the results for participants who did not support the right to humane treatment, only the data for participants who supported the right to humane treatment were used in this analysis ($n = 172$).

Part II. The hypocrisy induction procedure involved showing participants their responses for the scenario on which they were most discrepant for Part I. Therefore, only the measures for the scenario on which participants were most discrepant were used in tests of the hypotheses for Part II. Note that, to avoid confusion, I refer to toleration for the scenario on which participants were most discrepant during Part I (i.e., before the hypocrisy manipulation) as "Part I toleration." I refer to toleration for the scenario on which participants were most discrepant during Part II (i.e., after the hypocrisy manipulation) as "Part II toleration." Because the hypocrisy manipulation was not expected to be relevant to participants who did not support the right to humane treatment in the abstract, only the data for participants who did support the right to humane treatment in the abstract were used in the analyses for Part II ($n = 172$).

Hypothesis 6a. I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would become less tolerant of the torture (when asked to respond to the same scenario

again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition.

In order to examine changes in toleration, I computed a change score by subtracting Part II toleration from Part I toleration. Positive scores indicated a reduction in toleration from Part I to Part II.

To test this hypothesis, I used hierarchical multiple regression with changes in toleration as the outcome variable, and Part I toleration, condition (hypocrisy or control), and the two-way interaction between Part I toleration and condition as the predictor variables. In step one of the analysis, I regressed changes in toleration onto centred Part I toleration and condition (Aiken & West, 1991). In step two, I added the two-way interaction for Part I toleration by condition. Results of significance tests for each of the predictor variables in this analysis are reported only for the step in which they are entered (e.g., when reporting the significance tests for the main effect of Part I toleration, I report results for the first step of the analysis).

Hypothesis 6b. I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would be more willing to help the target of the human rights violation (when asked to respond to the same scenario again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition. The results for this hypothesis were analyzed using hierarchical multiple regression, with willingness to help the target as the outcome variable, and Part I toleration, condition (hypocrisy or control), and the two-way interaction between Part I toleration and condition as the predictor variables. In step one of the analysis, I regressed willingness to help the target onto centred Part I toleration and condition. In step two, I added the two-way interaction for Part I toleration by condition.

Results of significance tests for each of the predictor variables in this analysis are reported only for the step in which they are entered.

Hypothesis 6c. I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would be more likely to ask for additional information about supporting human rights if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition. The dependent variable for this hypothesis was binary (i.e., 1 = requested information, 0 = did not request information). For this reason, I tested this hypothesis using hierarchical logistic regression, with whether or not participants requested additional information as the outcome variable, and Part I toleration, condition (hypocrisy or control), and the two-way interaction between Part I toleration and condition as the predictor variables. In step one of the analysis, I regressed whether or not participants asked for additional information onto centred Part I toleration and condition. In step two, I added the two-way interaction for Part I toleration by condition. Results of significance tests for each of the predictor variables in this analysis are reported only for the step in which they are entered.

Results⁴

Part I

An alpha of .05 is assumed throughout. Correlations between all variables used in Part I can be found in Table 1. Means and standard deviations for all variables used in Part I can be found in Table 2.

Preliminary results.

Outliers and normality. I first conducted preliminary analyses on the variables that were measured before the hypocrisy manipulation. These variables were the abstract support for human rights items and responses to the scenarios at Part I. I started by screening for outliers. Z-scores were computed for each of the variables and any scores that were greater than $|3|$ were considered outliers. The only variable for which outliers were a concern was the exploratory variable of general attitudes toward human rights. This variable had five z-scores in its distribution that were less than -3 (2.23% of the total sample). A closer examination of the distribution of scores indicated that participants tended to select only three of the seven values on the response scale for that variable, either 5, 6, or 7. The majority of the sample selected 6 and 7, indicating that most participants strongly supported universal human rights ($M = 6.92$, $SD = 0.35$). Statistically, therefore, participants who selected 5 became outliers. Because of the lack of variability on the general support for human rights variable, it was not used in any further analyses.

⁴ Missing data analyses are not mentioned because none of the variables had enough missing data to perform said analyses. Thus, I concluded that there was no reason to be concerned about missing data.

Table 1.

Correlations for Variables in Part I

| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--------|-----|
| 1. Abstract Support for Humane Treatment | -- | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Tolerant (low) | -.220** | -- | | | | | | | | | |
| 3. Perceived Deservingness (low) | -.210** | .615** | -- | | | | | | | | |
| 4. Perceived Morality (low) | .002 | -.176** | -.342** | -- | | | | | | | |
| 5. Perceived Likelihood (low) | -.056 | .244** | .364** | -.370** | -- | | | | | | |
| 6. Tolerant (high) | -.188** | .639** | .438** | -.164* | .250** | -- | | | | | |
| 7. Perceived Deservingness (high) | -.144* | .341** | .541** | -.265** | .189** | .615** | -- | | | | |
| 8. Perceived Morality (high) | -.070 | -.029 | -.122 | .442** | -.173* | -.201** | -.384** | -- | | | |
| 9. Perceived Likelihood (high) | -.050 | .205** | .261** | -.276** | .698** | .416** | .396** | -.345** | -- | | |
| 10. Differences in Tolerant | -.006 | -.293** | .125 | .019 | -.045 | -.548** | -.393** | .219** | -.294** | -- | |
| 11. Differences in Deservingness | -.035 | .195** | .332** | -.012 | .130 | -.279** | -.614** | .317** | -.200** | .559** | -- |

Note. Listwise $N = 221$ for all correlations. Variables measured in response to the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios are labelled accordingly. High scores indicate greater degrees of the construct.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed.

Table 2.

Means and Standard Deviations for Variables in Part I

| | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> | | |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------|-------------|-----------|
| Abstract Support for Humane Treatment | 5.60 | 1.69 | | |
| Differences in Toleration | -0.51 | 1.24 | | |
| Differences in Deservingness | -1.02 | 1.64 | | |
| | <i>Moral Reprehensibility</i> | | | |
| | <i>Low</i> | | <i>High</i> | |
| | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> |
| Toleration | 2.21 | 1.35 | 2.72 | 1.55 |
| Perceived Deservingness | 2.91 | 1.53 | 3.93 | 1.83 |
| Perceived Morality | 2.93 | 0.87 | 2.35 | 0.94 |
| Perceived Likelihood | 45.34 | 24.95 | 53.15 | 24.39 |

Note. Listwise $N = 221$ for all means.

Next, I checked the distributions for any violations of normality. Initial examination of the Q-Q plots and histograms for each of the variables indicated that there were no serious deviations from normality. I also examined the skewness and kurtosis scores for each variable. I considered skewness and kurtosis scores that were greater than |2| to indicate substantial deviations from normality. None of the variables included in my analyses were substantially skewed or kurtotic based on these criteria. In summary, I concluded that the variables were essentially normally distributed.

Moral reprehensibility manipulation check. If the moral reprehensibility manipulation was effective, participants should have rated the target and his behaviour as more immoral when he had killed children (high moral reprehensibility scenario) compared to when he had injured soldiers (low moral reprehensibility scenario). I therefore conducted a paired-samples t test comparing participants' judgments of morality in the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios. Participants thought the target and his behaviour were less moral when he killed children ($M = 2.36$, $SD = 0.95$)

compared to when he injured soldiers ($M = 2.92$, $SD = 0.88$), $t(222) = 8.470$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.612$. Thus, the moral reprehensibility manipulation was effective.

Tests of hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1. I expected that there would be more toleration of the rights violation when the target had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression compared to when he had committed a less morally reprehensible transgression. To test this hypothesis, I used a paired-samples t test comparing average toleration ratings for the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios. Consistent with my hypothesis, participants tolerated the torture more when the target had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression ($M = 2.73$, $SD = 1.55$) compared to when he had committed a less morally reprehensible transgression ($M = 2.22$, $SD = 1.38$), $t(221) = -5.980$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.348$.⁵

Hypothesis 2. I expected that the effect of moral reprehensibility would be mediated by the extent to which the target of the human rights violation was seen to deserve harsh treatment. To test this hypothesis, I used the method recommended by Judd et al. (2001) to examine within-subjects mediation. For a detailed explanation of this method, refer to the information for Hypothesis 2 in the Experimental Design and Data Analysis section.

For the first step of this method, I tested the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation (the independent variable) on toleration (the dependent variable). As noted in the test of Hypothesis 1, participants tolerated the torture more for the high, compared

⁵ I tested whether social dominance orientation or right-wing authoritarianism moderated the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on the toleration of torture and on perceived deservingness. Neither individual difference variable moderated the effects of moral reprehensibility.

to low, moral reprehensibility scenario, indicating that the moral reprehensibility manipulation predicted differences in toleration between the two scenarios.

For the second step, I used a paired-samples t test to examine the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on perceived deservingness (the proposed mediator). The t test showed that participants thought the target deserved the torture more when he had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression ($M = 3.93$, $SD = 1.83$) compared to when he had committed a less morally reprehensible transgression ($M = 2.92$, $SD = 1.54$), $t(221) = -9.143$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.597$. These results indicated that the moral reprehensibility manipulation predicted differences in perceived deservingness.

In the third step, I used regression to examine whether perceived deservingness was related to toleration for each scenario. For the low moral reprehensibility scenario, deservingness significantly predicted toleration, $b = 0.557$, $\beta = 0.624$, $t(220) = 11.857$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .389$. For the high moral reprehensibility scenario, deservingness also significantly predicted toleration, $b = 0.519$, $\beta = 0.616$, $t(221) = 11.612$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .379$. For both scenarios, the more participants thought the target was deserving of harsh treatment, the more they tolerated the use of torture in his interrogation. For the next component of the third step, I used regression to test whether differences in perceived deservingness predicted differences in toleration. Differences in perceived deservingness significantly predicted differences in toleration, $b = 0.429$, $\beta = 0.565$, $t(220) = 10.154$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .319$. The greater the difference in participants' deservingness ratings in the two scenarios, the greater the difference in their toleration ratings. The results from this step indicated that differences in deservingness mediated the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on differences in toleration.

For the fourth step, I conducted a final regression analysis to examine whether differences in toleration are the result of subject-level differences in perceived deservingness. As described in the Experimental Design and Data Analysis section, to compute the subject-level differences in perceived deservingness, I added together the perceived deservingness scores for both scenarios, and then centred the summed scores. Next, I regressed differences in toleration onto differences in perceived deservingness and the centred sum for perceived deservingness. Differences in deservingness continued to predict differences in toleration after accounting for subject-level differences in deservingness, $b = 0.420$, $\beta = 0.553$, $t(219) = 9.749$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .294$. Subject-level differences in perceived deservingness did not predict within-subjects differences in toleration, $b = -0.025$, $\beta = -0.059$, $t(219) = -1.047$, $p = .296$, $sr^2 = .003$, indicating that subject-level differences in perceived deservingness did not moderate the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation.

For the final step in testing the within-subjects mediation hypothesis, I examined the intercept for the final regression equation. The intercept in the final regression equation for this analysis was not significantly different from 0, $b = -0.077$, $t(219) = -0.945$, $p = .346$. This result indicated that differences in perceived deservingness completely mediated the relationship between the moral reprehensibility manipulation and toleration.

In summary, the results of the within-subject mediation analyses supported Hypothesis 2, in that perceived deservingness fully mediated the effect of moral reprehensibility on toleration. When the target committed a highly morally reprehensible

(vs. less reprehensible) transgression, participants saw him as more deserving of the treatment that violated his rights, and, in turn, showed greater toleration for the violation.

Hypothesis 3. I hypothesized that the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on the toleration of torture would hold over and above participants' expressed support for the right to humane treatment. Specifically, I expected that participants would still make distinctions in the degree to which they tolerated the use of torture based on the moral reprehensibility of the target's past behaviour, over and above the influence of their abstract support for the right to humane treatment. To examine this hypothesis, I followed procedures outlined by Judd et al. (2001) for examining moderation of within-subjects effects. For a detailed explanation of this method, refer to the information for Hypothesis 3 in the Experimental Design and Data Analysis section.

For the first step of this method, I tested the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation (the independent variable) on toleration (the dependent variable). As noted in the results for Hypothesis 1, participants tolerated the torture more for the high, compared to low, moral reprehensibility scenario, indicating that the moral reprehensibility manipulation predicted differences in toleration between the two scenarios.

For the second and third steps, I used regression to test the main effect of abstract support for humane treatment (the individual difference moderator) on toleration, in the low and high moral reprehensibility conditions separately. Support for humane treatment significantly predicted toleration for both the low moral reprehensibility scenario, $b = -0.167$, $\beta = -0.204$, $t(220) = -3.091$, $p = .002$, $sr^2 = .042$, and the high moral reprehensibility scenario, $b = -0.170$, $\beta = -0.185$, $t(221) = -2.803$, $p = .006$, $sr^2 = .034$.

The more participants supported the right to humane treatment, the less they tolerated the torture in the scenarios.

For the final step in testing Hypothesis 3, I used regression to examine whether abstract support for humane treatment interacted with moral reprehensibility to predict differences in toleration. As described in the Experimental Design and Data Analysis section, I regressed differences in toleration onto centred scores for support for humane treatment. Support for humane treatment did not significantly predict differences in toleration, $b < 0.001$, $\beta < 0.001$, $t(220) = 0.006$, $p = .995$, $sr^2 < .001$. This result indicates that abstract support for humane treatment did not moderate the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on toleration.

In summary, the results of the moderation analyses were consistent with my hypothesis. There was a consistent main effect of abstract support for humane treatment on toleration for both scenarios, and differences in toleration were not affected by participants' support for the right to humane treatment (see Figure 12).




Figure 12. The effect of support for humane treatment on Part I toleration by moral reprehensibility. The slopes of the lines for toleration for the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios based on abstract support for humane treatment are parallel, indicating that moderation is not present.

Thus, participants did tolerate torture over and above their abstract support for humane treatment. Put another way, participants made distinctions in the extent to which they tolerated the torture based on the moral reprehensibility of the target's past transgression, regardless of their abstract support for humane treatment.

Hypothesis 4. I also expected that some participants would show a discrepancy between their abstract support for humane treatment and their toleration of human rights violations. Specifically, I expected some participants to tolerate the use of torture in at least one of the scenarios despite their abstract support for the right to humane treatment. For the purposes of this study, whether or not participants were discrepant was dependent on their supporting the right to humane treatment in the first place. Therefore, in testing Hypothesis 4, I only looked at those participants who scored above neutral on the item asking about support for the right to humane treatment. Recall that I defined “discrepant” as supporting the right to humane treatment (i.e., scoring above neutral [4] on the item asking about the right to humane treatment) and tolerating the use of torture in at least one of the scenarios (i.e., scoring at neutral [4] or below on the composite toleration measure). Overall, 50 participants (29.6% of those who supported the right to humane treatment) were discrepant in the predicted direction, whereas 119 (70.4%) participants were not discrepant. For the low moral reprehensibility scenario, 22 (13.0%) participants were discrepant in the predicted direction, whereas 147 (87.0%) participants were not discrepant. For the high moral reprehensibility scenario, 45 (26.6%) participants were discrepant in the predicted direction, whereas 124 (73.4%) participants were not discrepant. In summary, consistent with Hypothesis 4, some participants did show the

predicted discrepancy, such that they supported the right to humane treatment in the abstract, but tolerated torture in at least one of the torture scenarios.

Hypothesis 5. In addition to expecting some participants to be discrepant (such that they would show strong abstract support for humane treatment and tolerate an instance of torture), I predicted that the extent to which participants were discrepant would be greater for the high, compared to low, moral reprehensibility scenario. To test this hypothesis, I conducted a paired-samples t test comparing discrepancy scores for the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios. Recall that, to compute discrepancy scores for this hypothesis, I reverse-scored the toleration composite variables for each scenario, and then subtracted the reverse-scored variable from participants' abstract support for humane treatment variable. This procedure resulted in a continuous measure of the degree of discrepancy for the low and high moral reprehensibility scenarios.

As for Hypothesis 4, I only analyzed data for participants who supported the right to humane treatment in the abstract. Supporting my hypothesis, the t test indicated that participants were more discrepant in their support for humane treatment when the target had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression ($M = 1.00$, $SD = 1.55$) compared to a less morally reprehensible transgression ($M = 0.49$, $SD = 1.40$), $t(171) = -5.373$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.345$.

Ancillary analyses. There were several other variables that I analyzed in order to better understand the nature of the effects that I found in my main analyses. In this section, I will present the results of analyses using participants' perceived likelihood that the target of torture was withholding useful information.

Perceived likelihood of having information as an alternate mediator of the effect of moral reprehensibility on toleration. As predicted, perceived deservingness mediated the effect of moral reprehensibility on toleration of the human rights violation. However, participants might have assumed that the target who had engaged in highly morally reprehensible past behaviour was more likely to be withholding useful information compared to the target who had engaged in less reprehensible behaviour (even though the past behaviours were unrelated to the target's current interrogation). Thus, the perceived likelihood that the target was withholding information could have been an additional mediator, along with deservingness. I used the method recommended by Judd et al. (2001) to examine the perceived likelihood variable as a within-subjects mediator. For a detailed explanation of this method, refer to the information for Hypothesis 2 in the Experimental Design and Data Analysis section.

For the first step of this method, I tested the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation (the independent variable) on toleration (the dependent variable). As noted in the results for Hypothesis 1, participants tolerated the torture more for the high, compared to low, moral reprehensibility scenario, indicating that the moral reprehensibility manipulation predicted differences in toleration between the two scenarios.

For the second step, I used a paired-samples t test to examine the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on perceived likelihood (the proposed mediator). Participants perceived that there was a greater likelihood that the target was withholding information about terrorist activities when he had killed children ($M = 53.18$, $SD = 24.33$) compared to when he had injured soldiers ($M = 45.52$, $SD = 25.04$), $t(221) = -5.926$,

$p < .001$, $d = -0.310$. These results indicated that the moral reprehensibility manipulation predicted differences in the perceived likelihood measure.

For the third step, I used regression to test whether perceived likelihood was related to the dependent variable for each scenario. For the low moral reprehensibility scenario, perceived likelihood significantly predicted toleration, $b = 0.013$, $\beta = 0.244$, $t(219) = 3.730$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .060$. Perceived likelihood also significantly predicted toleration in the high moral reprehensibility scenario, $b = 0.026$, $\beta = 0.413$, $t(220) = 6.730$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .171$. For both scenarios, the more participants perceived that the target was likely to be withholding information on terrorist activities, the more they tolerated the use of torture in his interrogation. For the next component of the third step, I used regression to test whether differences in perceived likelihood predicted differences in toleration. As was done with the difference scores for toleration and deservingness, the difference scores for perceived likelihood of withholding information were computed by subtracting the scores for the high moral reprehensibility scenario from the scores for the low moral reprehensibility scenario. Differences in perceived likelihood significantly predicted differences in toleration scores, $b = 0.020$, $\beta = 0.316$, $t(219) = 4.924$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .100$, such that the greater the difference in participants' perceived likelihood ratings between the two scenarios, the greater the difference in their toleration ratings. The results from this third step indicated that either full or partial mediation is present.

For the fourth step, I calculated a final regression equation to examine whether differences in toleration are the result of subject-level differences in perceived likelihood. To compute the subject-level differences in perceived likelihood, I added together the

perceived likelihood scores for both scenarios, and then centred the summed scores.

Analogous to the test of Hypothesis 2, I next regressed differences in toleration onto differences in perceived likelihood and the centred sum for perceived likelihood.

Differences in perceived likelihood continued to predict differences in toleration after accounting for the centred sum for perceived likelihood, $b = 0.021$, $\beta = 0.322$,

$t(218) = 5.115$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .104$. Additionally, the centred sum for perceived

likelihood significantly predicted differences in toleration scores, $b = -0.005$, $\beta = -0.193$,

$t(218) = -3.067$, $p = .002$, $sr^2 = .037$, indicating that differences in toleration vary as a function of the subject-level average of perceived likelihood.

For the final step in testing perceived likelihood as a within-subjects mediator, I examined the intercept for the final regression equation. The regression coefficient for the intercept was significantly different from 0, $b = -0.349$, $t(218) = -4.143$, $p < .001$, indicating that only partial mediation was present. When the target committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression, participants believed he was more likely to be withholding useful information and, in turn, they showed greater toleration of his torture.

Perceived likelihood and deservingness as co-mediators of the effect of moral reprehensibility on toleration. Although the above analyses show that the perceived likelihood variable partially mediated the effect of moral reprehensibility on the toleration of torture, they do not test whether perceived likelihood mediated this relationship in place of or in addition to perceived deservingness. To test whether perceived deservingness and perceived likelihood both mediated the relationship between moral reprehensibility and toleration, I regressed differences in toleration onto differences in perceived deservingness, differences in perceived likelihood, the centred

sum for perceived deservingness, and the centred sum for perceived likelihood.

Differences in deservingness continued to significantly predicted differences in toleration, $b = 0.386$, $\beta = 0.507$, $t(216) = 8.207$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .203$. However, differences in perceived likelihood no longer significantly predicted differences in toleration, $b = 0.007$, $\beta = 0.106$, $t(216) = 1.747$, $p = .082$, $sr^2 = .009$. Thus, the perceived likelihood that the target was withholding information did not significantly mediate the relationship between moral reprehensibility and toleration after accounting for perceived deservingness. The regression analysis also showed that the regression weight for the centred sum for perceived likelihood was still significant, $b = -0.005$, $\beta = -0.167$, $t(216) = -2.820$, $p = .005$, $sr^2 = .024$, indicating that differences in toleration still varied with the subject-level average of perceived likelihood. The centred sum for deservingness was not significant, $b = -0.001$, $\beta = -0.002$, $t(216) = -0.026$, $p = .980$, $sr^2 < .001$. Finally, the intercept for this regression equation was not significantly different from 0, $b = -0.064$, $t(216) = -0.782$, $p = .435$, indicating that full mediation was present.

In summary, the results of the analyses examining both perceived deservingness and perceived likelihood as potential mediators, indicated that deservingness continued to fully mediate the relationship between moral reprehensibility and toleration after accounting for perceived likelihood. Additionally, subject-level differences in perceived likelihood continued to moderate the relationship between moral reprehensibility and toleration after accounting for perceived deservingness.

Perceived likelihood of having information as a mediator of the effect of moral reprehensibility on deservingness. One possible explanation for why perceived

likelihood was no longer a significant mediator after accounting for deservingness is that perceived likelihood mediated the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on perceived deservingness. That is, participants' tendency to believe that the target who engaged in more morally reprehensible behaviour was more likely to possess useful information might have led them to see the target as more deserving of harsh treatment. To explore whether or not this was the case, I again used the method for within-subject mediation described by Judd et al. (2001).

For the first step of this method, I tested the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation (the independent variable) on perceived deservingness (the dependent variable). As described in the section on Hypothesis 2, participants thought the target deserved the torture more when he had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression compared to when he had committed a less morally reprehensible transgression.

For the second step, I examined whether the moral reprehensibility manipulation predicted differences in perceived likelihood (the proposed mediator). As described earlier in the Ancillary Analyses section, participants perceived that there was a greater likelihood that the target was withholding information about terrorist activities when he had killed children compared to when he had injured soldiers.

For the third step, I used regression to examine whether perceived likelihood was related to perceived deservingness for each scenario. Perceived likelihood significantly predicted perceived deservingness for the low moral reprehensibility scenario, $b = 0.022$, $\beta = 0.364$, $t(219) = 5.790$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .132$, as well as for the high moral reprehensibility scenario, $b = 0.030$, $\beta = 0.392$, $t(220) = 6.322$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .154$. For

both scenarios, participants who thought the target was more likely to be withholding important information also perceived that he was more deserving of harsh treatment. For the next component of the third step, I regressed differences in deservingness onto differences in perceived likelihood. Differences in perceived likelihood significantly predicted differences in deservingness, $b = 0.036$, $\beta = 0.424$, $t(219) = 6.919$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .180$. The results for this analysis indicated that perceived likelihood either fully or partially mediated the relationship between moral reprehensibility and perceived deservingness.

For the fourth step, I conducted a final regression analysis to examine whether subject-level differences in perceived likelihood moderated the effect of moral reprehensibility on within-subject differences in perceived deservingness. I regressed differences in deservingness onto differences in perceived likelihood and the centred sum for perceived likelihood. Perceived likelihood continued to mediate the relationship between moral reprehensibility and perceived deservingness after accounting for the centred sum for perceived likelihood, $b = 0.036$, $\beta = 0.425$, $t(218) = 6.936$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .425$. The centred sum for perceived likelihood did not significantly predict differences in deservingness, $b = -0.002$, $\beta = -0.050$, $t(218) = -0.808$, $p = .420$, $sr^2 = .003$. Thus, subject-level differences in perceived likelihood did not moderate the relationship between moral reprehensibility and deservingness.

For the final step, I examined the intercept for the final regression equation. Because the regression coefficient for the intercept was still significantly different from 0, $b = -0.740$, $t(218) = -6.853$, $p < .001$, I can conclude that perceived likelihood only partially mediated the effect of moral reprehensibility on deservingness.

Summary of analyses for perceived likelihood. In summary, the results from this section indicate that participants believed the target who had committed a highly reprehensible transgression was more likely to be withholding useful information compared to the target who had committed a less reprehensible transgression. However, perceived deservingness of the target for harsh treatment continued to mediate the effect of moral reprehensibility over and above perceived likelihood. In addition, perceived likelihood partially mediated the effect of the moral reprehensibility manipulation on perceived deservingness. Figure 13 shows the conceptual model that is indicated by the results of analyses for perceived likelihood.




Figure 13. The conceptual model indicated by the results of the analyses for perceived likelihood.

Part II

An alpha of .05 is assumed throughout. Correlations between all variables used in Part II can be found in Table 3. Means and standard deviations for all variables used in Part II can be found in Table 4.

Table 3.

Correlations for Variables in Part II

| | 1. | 2. | 3. | 4. | 5. | 6. | 7. | 8. | 9. | 10. | 11. | 12. |
|--|-------|---------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| 1. Abstract Support for Humane Treatment | -- | -.269* | -.192 | -.151 | -.094 | -.210 | -.261* | .072 | -.098 | -.085 | -.006 | .070 |
| 2. Negative Arousal | .082 | -- | .237* | .045 | .387* | .179 | .136 | .077 | .035 | -.045 | .104 | .071 |
| 3. Tolerance (Part I) | -.194 | .095 | -- | .871** | .325** | .666** | .638** | .077 | -.248* | -.216* | -.013 | -.251* |
| 4. Tolerance (Part II) | -.167 | .095 | .739** | -- | -.183 | .601** | .691** | -.116 | -.222* | -.229* | .037 | -.273* |
| 5. Changes in Tolerance | -.076 | .020 | .542** | -.166 | -- | .176 | -.053 | .377** | -.068 | .009 | -.096 | .024 |
| 6. Deservingness (Part I) | -.128 | .069 | .664** | .581** | .246* | -- | .812** | .349** | -.515** | -.420** | -.065 | -.386** |
| 7. Deservingness (Part II) | -.153 | .068 | .541** | .665** | -.038 | .698** | -- | -.263* | -.399** | -.427** | .089 | -.349** |
| 8. Changes in Deservingness | .014 | .010 | .234* | -.027 | .376** | .495** | -.277* | -- | -.211 | -.008 | -.250* | -.077 |
| 9. Morality (Part I) | .067 | .008 | -.343** | -.402** | -.002 | -.439** | -.551** | .079 | -- | .709** | .271* | .339** |
| 10. Morality (Part II) | .129 | -.060 | -.302** | -.343** | -.014 | -.296** | -.510** | .222* | .812** | -- | -.486** | .404** |
| 11. Changes in Morality | -.128 | .114 | .037 | .026 | .022 | -.107 | .103 | -.269* | .006 | -.578** | -- | -.131 |
| 12. Behavioural Intention | .155 | -.070 | -.528** | -.475** | -.180 | -.561** | -.410** | -.257* | .424** | .333** | .021 | -- |

Note. Correlations for the hypocrisy condition are above the diagonal in bold and correlations for the control condition are below the diagonal. Listwise $N = 84$ for the hypocrisy condition and listwise $N = 80$ for the control condition. High scores indicate greater degrees of the construct.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. All tests are two-tailed.

Table 4.

Means and Standard Deviations for Variables in Part II

| | Condition | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| | Control | | Hypocrisy | |
| | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> |
| Abstract Support for Humane Treatment | 6.36 | 0.75 | 6.46 | 0.72 |
| Negative Arousal | 2.30 | 1.13 | 2.38 | 1.21 |
| Toleration (Part I) | 2.77 | 1.47 | 2.60 | 1.54 |
| Toleration (Part II) | 1.98 | 1.25 | 2.10 | 1.48 |
| Changes in Toleration | 0.79 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 0.77 |
| Deservingness (Part I) | 3.77 | 1.88 | 3.40 | 2.00 |
| Deservingness (Part II) | 3.12 | 1.70 | 2.92 | 1.94 |
| Changes in Deservingness | 0.65 | 1.40 | 0.48 | 1.21 |
| Morality (Part I) | 2.42 | 0.92 | 2.59 | 0.98 |
| Morality (Part II) | 2.62 | 1.13 | 2.68 | 1.08 |
| Changes in Morality | -0.19 | 0.66 | -0.10 | 0.79 |
| Behavioural Intention | 3.32 | 1.71 | 3.45 | 1.65 |

Note. Listwise $N = 84$ for the hypocrisy condition and listwise $N = 80$ for the control condition.

Preliminary results.

Outliers and normality. I conducted preliminary analyses for the measures that followed the hypocrisy manipulation. Procedures for identifying outliers and normality were similar to those for Part I.

Control condition. Extreme outliers were found on two variables: Part II toleration ($z = 3.66$) and perceived morality measured in Part II ($z = 3.89$). The extreme outlier for Part II toleration was excluded from all analyses. Results including this outlier are described in footnotes. Additionally, the outlier for perceived morality in Part II was excluded from the relevant ancillary analyses; results including this outlier are described in footnotes.

Examination of the Q-Q plots, histograms, skewness, and kurtosis scores for each of the variables indicated departures from normality for only one variable. Specifically, the kurtosis score for perceived morality for the high moral reprehensibility scenario

indicated that the distribution of this variable was leptokurtic ($kurtosis = 2.00$). As this variable was not used in any of the hypothesis tests, the distribution was not cause for concern.

Hypocrisy condition. None of the variables had any extreme outliers. Thus, all scores were used in the analyses. Examination of the Q-Q plots, histograms, skewness, and kurtosis scores for each of the variables indicated no serious deviations from normality.

Examination of residuals. Examination of the standardized residuals indicated that there were two multivariate outliers ($z > |3.00|$). These outliers were excluded from all analyses for Part II, but results including these outliers are reported in footnotes. Further examination of the residuals indicated that errors were equally distributed across predictors.

Excluded participants. There were five participants who did not select the correct answer for the question that was used to determine on which scenario they were most discrepant. Participants who selected the wrong answer to this question were excluded for two reasons: (1) their response indicates that they might not have been paying attention, and (2) those in the hypocrisy condition would have been shown the wrong scenario for the second part of the essay task. Because their error would have been a more serious problem for Part II (the hypocrisy induction portion of the study) than for Part I of the study, these participants were only excluded from the analyses for Part II. There was also one participant who was excluded due to not following the instructions on the essay task for Part II.

Additionally, because the hypocrisy manipulation was only expected to be relevant to those who supported the right to humane treatment, participants who reported feeling neutral toward or who disagreed with this right ($n = 51$) were excluded from all analyses for Part II. This exclusion is analogous to the method used by Son Hing et al. (2002), where participants who were high in explicit racism were excluded from the study because the hypocrisy manipulation was only expected to be relevant to those low in explicit racism.

Affect manipulation check.⁶ If dissonance was aroused in the hypocrisy condition as intended, then the more participants in that condition tolerated the torture in Part I, the more they should have experienced negative arousal after the hypocrisy manipulation in Part II. The same pattern should not occur for participants in the control condition. Thus, I expected a significant interaction between Part I toleration and condition on the negative arousal measure. To test for this interaction, I used hierarchical regression with negative arousal as the outcome variable. Specifically, I regressed negative arousal onto Part I toleration and condition in the first step, and the interaction between these two predictors in the second step. There was a significant main effect of Part I toleration on negative arousal in the first step of the analysis, $b = 0.134$, $\beta = 0.172$, $t(162) = 2.224$, $p = .028$, $sr^2 = .029$. The more participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the greater the negative arousal they experienced after the essay task. The effects for condition ($p = .613$) and the two-way interaction between Part I toleration and condition ($p = .357$) were nonsignificant. The results suggest that, in *both* the hypocrisy and control conditions, the more participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the more they experienced dissonance. I return to this point in the Discussion.

⁶ Inclusion of univariate and multivariate outliers did not substantially affect the results for this analysis.

Tests of hypotheses.^{7,8}

Hypothesis 6a. I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would become less tolerant of the torture (when asked to respond to the same scenario again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition. To test this hypothesis, I regressed changes in toleration onto Part I toleration, condition, and the interaction between Part I toleration and condition.

The regression yielded a significant main effect of Part I toleration on changes in toleration, $b = 0.259$, $\beta = 0.432$, $t(161) = 6.159$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .186$. The more participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the greater the reduction in their toleration from Part I to Part II. There was also a marginally significant main effect of condition on changes in toleration, $b = -0.240$, $\beta = -0.134$, $t(161) = -1.908$, $p = .058$, $sr^2 = .018$. Participants in the control condition showed a greater reduction in their toleration of torture from Part I to Part II compared to those in the hypocrisy condition. The main effects were subsumed by a significant interaction between Part I toleration and condition, $b = -0.208$, $\beta = -0.254$, $t(160) = -2.510$, $p = .013$, $sr^2 = .030$. Although I hypothesized a two-way interaction, further analysis indicated that the pattern of results was not as predicted. I conducted simple slopes analyses for the effect of condition on changes in toleration, using -1.68 and 3.65 for low and high Part I toleration, respectively. The slope of the line for those high in Part I toleration was significantly different from 0, $b = -0.998$, $\beta = -0.556$, $t(160) = 3.059$, $p = .003$, $sr^2 = .045$, as predicted.

⁷ I tested whether individual differences in preference for consistency moderated the effect of the hypocrisy induction manipulation on the toleration, behavioural intention, and behavioural dependent variables. None of these effects were moderated by preference for consistency.

⁸ Inclusion of univariate and multivariate outliers did not substantially affect the results for these analyses.

However, those in the control condition reduced their toleration from Part I to Part II to a *greater* extent than those in the hypocrisy condition, a pattern opposite to my hypothesis. The slope of the line for those low in Part I toleration was not significantly different from 0, $b = 0.111$, $\beta = 0.062$, $t(160) = 0.594$, $p = .554$, $sr^2 = .002$, as expected (see Figure 14). For another perspective, I also conducted simple slopes analyses for the relation between Part I toleration and changes in toleration, within the hypocrisy and control conditions. The slope for the control condition was significantly different from 0, $b = 0.370$, $\beta = 0.619$, $t(160) = 6.097$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .176$, as was the slope for the hypocrisy condition, $b = 0.162$, $\beta = 0.270$, $t(160) = 2.883$, $p = .005$, $sr^2 = .039$. For participants in both conditions, the more they tolerated the torture in Part I, the more they reduced their toleration from Part I to Part II (see Figure 15).




Figure 14. The effect of condition on changes in toleration moderated by Part I toleration.




Figure 15. The effect of Part I tolerance on changes in tolerance moderated by condition.

Hypothesis 6b. I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would be more willing to help the target of the human rights violation (when asked to respond to the same scenario again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition. To test this hypothesis, I regressed willingness to help the target onto Part I tolerance, condition, and the interaction between these two predictors.

The regression yielded a significant main effect of Part I tolerance on willingness to help the target, $b = -0.430$, $\beta = -0.385$, $t(161) = -5.289$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .147$. The more participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the less willing they were to help the target of the torture. The main effect for condition on willingness to help the target was nonsignificant, $b = 0.062$, $\beta = 0.018$, $t(161) = 0.253$, $p = .800$, $sr^2 < .001$. Consistent with my hypothesis, there was a significant effect of the interaction between Part I tolerance and condition on willingness to help the target, $b = 0.348$, $\beta = 0.228$, $t(160) = 2.158$, $p = .032$, $sr^2 = .024$. I conducted simple slopes analyses for the effect of condition on willingness to help the target, using -1.68 and 3.65 for low and high Part I tolerance,

respectively. The slope of the line for those high in Part I toleration was significantly different from 0, $b = 1.328$, $\beta = 0.397$, $t(160) = 2.094$, $p = .038$, $sr^2 = .023$, whereas the slope of the line for those low in Part I toleration was not significantly different from 0, $b = -0.525$, $\beta = -0.157$, $t(160) = -1.446$, $p = .150$, $sr^2 = .011$. As hypothesized, the participants who were high in Part I toleration were more willing to help the target of the torture if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition, whereas participants who were low in Part I toleration were similarly willing to help the target in both conditions (see Figure 16). For another perspective, I calculated the simple slopes for the relation between Part I toleration and willingness to help the target, within conditions. The slope for the control condition was significantly different from 0, $b = -0.616$, $\beta = -0.553$, $t(160) = -5.220$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .141$, as was the slope for the hypocrisy condition, $b = -0.269$, $\beta = -0.241$, $t(160) = -2.455$, $p = .015$, $sr^2 = .031$. In both conditions, participants were more willing to help the target of the torture the less they tolerated the torture in Part I (see Figure 17).




Figure 16. The effect of condition on willingness to help the target moderated by Part I toleration.




Figure 17. The effect of Part I tolerance on willingness to help the target moderated by condition.

Hypothesis 6c. I hypothesized that, among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would be more likely to ask for additional information about supporting human rights if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition. To test this hypothesis, I used logistic regression with whether or not participants requested additional information as the outcome variable, and Part I tolerance, condition, and the interaction between these two variables as the predictors. Results did not confirm my hypothesis.

The results for the main effects of Part I tolerance and condition on whether participants asked for additional information can be found in Table 5. There was a significant main effect of condition on whether or not participants requested additional information. Participants were more likely to ask for information if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition. The effects of Part I tolerance ($p = .338$) and the interaction ($p = .477$) were not significant.

Table 5.

Logistic Regression of Likelihood of Asking for Information on Part I Toleration and Condition

| | <i>B</i> | <i>SE</i> | <i>Wald statistic</i> | <i>df</i> | <i>p</i> | <i>e^B</i> |
|-------------------|----------|-----------|-----------------------|-----------|----------|----------------------|
| Part I Toleration | -0.103 | 0.107 | 0.918 | 1 | 0.338 | 0.903 |
| Condition | 0.644 | 0.322 | 4.014 | 1 | 0.045 | 1.905 |

Note. The statistics in this table are from the step that included both predictors, but not the interaction.

Ancillary analyses. In this section, I will present the results of tests involving the deservingness and perceived morality measures for Part II of the study. The Part II measures of perceived deservingness and morality are those that were administered *after* the hypocrisy manipulation, when participants responded to the torture scenarios a second time. These analyses were conducted to help shed further light on the results for the tests of hypotheses for Part II.

Changes in perceived deservingness as a mediator of the Part I toleration by condition interaction effect on changes in toleration and willingness to help. The following analyses tested whether the interaction effects obtained in tests of Hypotheses 6a or 6b could be accounted for by changes in perceived deservingness from the first time participants responded to the torture scenarios to the second time they responded to these scenarios. To test changes in deservingness as a potential mediator, I used the method described by Baron and Kenny (1986) for testing between-subjects mediation (see the Experimental Design and Data Analysis section). First, as for changes in toleration, I computed a change score by subtracting Part II deservingness from Part I deservingness. Positive scores indicated a reduction in deservingness from Part I to Part II.

Changes in toleration. The first step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and condition) predicts the dependent variable (changes in toleration). The results of

Hypothesis 6a indicated that the interaction between Part I toleration and condition predicted changes in toleration.

The second step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and condition) predicts the mediator (changes in perceived deservingness). To examine this step, I regressed changes in perceived deservingness onto Part I toleration, condition, and the interaction. In the first step of the regression analysis, Part I toleration significantly predicted changes in deservingness, $b = 0.138$, $\beta = 0.160$, $t(162) = 2.057$, $p = .041$, $sr^2 = .026$. The more participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the greater the reduction in perceived deservingness. The second and third steps of the regression analysis indicated that neither condition nor the interaction significantly predicted changes in deservingness, $ps > .05$. Thus, changes in perceived deservingness did not mediate the interaction between Part I toleration and condition.

However, because the main effect for Part I toleration significantly predicted changes in deservingness, it was possible that changes in perceived deservingness mediated the main effect of Part I toleration on changes in toleration. As I established in the results for Hypothesis 6a, Part I toleration significantly predicted changes in toleration (the first step in examining between-subjects mediation). Additionally, the analysis described in the previous paragraph established that Part I toleration significantly predicted changes in perceived deservingness (the second step in examining between-subjects mediation). The third step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the mediator (changes in perceived deservingness) predicts the dependent variable (changes in toleration). For this step, I regressed changes in toleration onto changes in

perceived deservingness. Changes in perceived deservingness significantly predicted changes in toleration, $b = 0.263$, $\beta = 0.381$, $t(162) = 5.241$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .145$. The greater the reduction in perceived deservingness, the greater the reduction in toleration.

The final step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the effect of the independent variable (Part I toleration) on the dependent variable (changes in toleration) is no longer significant after accounting for the effect of the mediator (changes in perceived deservingness). For this step, I regressed changes in toleration onto changes in perceived deservingness and Part I toleration. The results of this analysis indicated that there was a significant effect on changes in toleration for both changes in deservingness, $b = 0.220$, $\beta = 0.319$, $t(161) = 4.746$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .099$, and Part I toleration, $b = 0.233$, $\beta = 0.388$, $t(161) = 5.784$, $p < .001$, $sr^2 = .147$. The results of this analysis indicate that changes in perceived deservingness and Part I toleration independently predict changes in toleration. Thus, perceived deservingness did not mediate the effect of Part I toleration on changes in toleration.

Willingness to help. The first step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and condition) predicts the dependent variable (willingness to help). The results of Hypothesis 6b indicated that Part I toleration, condition, and the interaction between Part I toleration and condition predicted willingness to help.

The second step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and condition) predicts the mediator (changes in perceived deservingness). The previous section established that Part I toleration, but not condition or the interaction, significantly predicted changes in

perceived deservingness. Because the main effect for Part I toleration significantly predicted changes in deservingness, it was possible that changes in perceived deservingness mediated the main effect of Part I toleration on willingness to help. As I established in the results for Hypothesis 6b, Part I toleration significantly predicted willingness to help (the first step in examining between-subjects mediation). Additionally, the analysis described in the previous section established that Part I toleration significantly predicted changes in perceived deservingness (the second step in examining between-subjects mediation). The third step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the mediator (changes in perceived deservingness) predicts the dependent variable (willingness to help). For this step, I regressed willingness to help onto changes in perceived deservingness. Changes in perceived deservingness significantly predicted willingness to help, $b = -0.224$, $\beta = -0.175$, $t(162) = -2.258$, $p = .025$, $sr^2 = .031$. The greater the reduction in perceived deservingness, the less willing participants were to help the target.

The final step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the effect of the independent variable (Part I toleration) on the dependent variable (willingness to help) is no longer significant after accounting for the effect of the mediator (changes in perceived deservingness). For this step, I regressed willingness to help onto changes in perceived deservingness and Part I toleration. The results of this analysis indicated that changes in perceived deservingness did not significantly predict willingness to help, $b = -0.149$, $\beta = -0.116$, $t(161) = -1.588$, $p = .114$, $sr^2 = .013$. Thus, changes in perceived deservingness did not mediate the effect of Part I toleration on willingness to help the target.

*Changes in perceived morality as a mediator of the Part I toleration by condition interaction effect on changes in toleration and willingness to help.*⁹ The following analyses tested whether any of the results for Hypotheses 6a or 6b could be accounted for by changes in perceived morality from the first time participants responded to the torture scenarios to the second time they responded to these scenarios. To test changes in perceived morality as a potential mediator, I used the method described by Baron and Kenny (1986) for testing between-subjects mediation (see the Experimental Design and Data Analysis section). First, as for changes in toleration, I computed a change score by subtracting Part II perceived morality from Part I perceived morality. Positive scores indicated a reduction in perceived morality from Part I to Part II.

Changes in toleration. The first step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and condition) predicts the dependent variable (changes in toleration). The results of Hypothesis 6a indicated that the interaction between Part I toleration and condition predicted changes in toleration.

The second step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and condition) predicts the mediator (changes in perceived morality). For this step, I regressed changes in perceived morality onto Part I toleration, condition, and the interaction. Neither of the main effects nor the interaction significantly predicted changes in perceived morality, all $ps > .05$. Thus, changes in perceived morality did not mediate the effect of the interaction between Part I toleration and condition on changes in toleration.

⁹ Inclusion of the univariate outlier did not substantially affect the results for these analyses.

Willingness to help. The first step in examining between-subjects mediation establishes that the independent variable (the interaction between Part I toleration and condition) predicts the dependent variable (willingness to help). The results of Hypothesis 6b indicated that Part I toleration, condition, and the interaction between Part I toleration and condition predicted willingness to help. However, as was indicated in the previous section, the interaction between Part I toleration and condition did not significantly predict changes in perceived morality. Therefore, changes in perceived morality did not mediate the effect of the interaction on changes in toleration.

Discussion

The main goals of my thesis were to (1) examine one reason why people tolerate human rights violations and to (2) explore one possible method for reducing this toleration. In the first part of my thesis, I investigated whether people tolerate human rights violations on the basis of the target's perceived deservingness. In the second part of my thesis, I examined whether or not the toleration of human rights violations in specific situations can be decreased through hypocrisy induction. Similar to how the previous sections of my thesis have been organized, the discussion of my findings and their implications will be presented separately for Parts I and II.

Part I: The Problem

Past research shows that people are motivated to see that they and others get what is deserved (e.g., Darley, 2009; Lerner, 1980). Therefore, similar to Hafer (2011), I proposed that people tolerate human rights violations to the extent that they perceive the target as deserving of the treatment that violates his or her rights. Research and theory also suggest that people do not take into account contextual factors (like perceived deservingness of individuals) when they form abstract opinions (e.g., Batson et al., 1999; Finkel, 2001). Thus, I proposed that some people are willing to tolerate human rights violations despite supporting human rights in the abstract.

Overall, the results from Part I of my study supported my arguments. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss the results for Hypotheses 1 to 5 as well as the potential implications of these findings.

Findings for Hypotheses 1 to 5.

Hypothesis 1. For my first hypothesis, I expected that people would tolerate a human rights violation more when the target had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression compared to when the target had committed a less morally reprehensible transgression. My hypothesis was supported. Participants tolerated a man's torture (a human rights violation) more when he had killed children, a highly reprehensible transgression, compared to when he injured soldiers, a less reprehensible transgression. Presumably, in the case of the highly morally reprehensible transgression, people saw the human rights violation as retribution for the target's past behaviour (see Carlsmith & Sood, 2009; Liberman, 2013). Research on retributive motivation indicates that people are motivated to see that wrongdoers get their "just deserts"; that transgressors receive a negative outcome or punishment that is proportionate to the moral reprehensibility of their offense (Darley, 2009). It is possible that participants were more willing to tolerate the violation when the target had killed children because the treatment he received was viewed as proportionate to the transgression and, therefore, perceived as relatively deserved. Conversely, when the target committed a less morally reprehensible transgression, it is likely that the treatment violating his human rights was seen as less proportionate to the transgression and, therefore, was perceived as less deserved. To more directly explore whether participants tolerated the human rights violation based on deservingness considerations, I also measured the perceived deservingness of the target for harsh treatment. The results for this variable are discussed next.

Hypothesis 2. For Hypothesis 2, I expected that deservingness would mediate the effect of the moral reprehensibility of the target's past transgression on toleration of the

human rights violation. The results supported my hypothesis. Perceived deservingness fully mediated the effect of moral reprehensibility on toleration. Participants thought the target was more deserving of harsh treatment and, in turn, were more willing to tolerate his torture when he had killed children compared to when he had injured soldiers. This finding is consistent with research discussed in the previous paragraph suggesting that people might tolerate a human rights violation to the extent that the target is seen to deserve the treatment.

One additional explanation for why participants tolerated the human rights violation to a greater extent when the target committed a highly reprehensible transgression is that they were more likely to believe that the target had important information on terrorist activities. For example, participants might have thought the target who killed children, because he was immoral, was more likely to have been lying about not knowing anything. If people believe that torturing a target might help avoid more violence in the future (e.g., avoid a potential terrorist attack) they might be more willing to tolerate the human rights violation (Carlsmith & Sood, 2009).

For both the high and low moral reprehensibility scenarios in the present study, the target claimed not to have any information. However, participants could still draw their own conclusions about whether or not the target had information. For this reason, I also measured how likely participants thought it was that the target was withholding important information. Interestingly, participants thought the target was more likely to be withholding information when he had committed the more morally reprehensible transgression. Additionally, the likelihood that the target had information partially mediated the relationship between the moral reprehensibility of the target's transgression

and toleration of the human rights violation. These results suggest that participants had both utilitarian as well as retributive reasons for greater toleration of torture for the target who had engaged in the more reprehensible past transgression. However, after accounting for perceived deservingness judgments, the likelihood of the target having information was no longer a significant mediator. Rather, further analyses indicated that the perceived likelihood that the target had information mediated the relationship between the moral reprehensibility of the target's past transgression and the target's perceived deservingness for harsh treatment. The greater the moral reprehensibility of the target's past transgression, the more participants thought he was likely to be withholding information and, in turn, the more participants thought he deserved harsh treatment. Therefore, it appears that what seemed to be utilitarian reasons for greater toleration of torture were in fact driven by a desire to see the target receive his just desserts.

I was also interested in the role of participants' abstract attitudes toward the right being violated. It was possible that moral reprehensibility would predict toleration even after accounting for participants' abstract attitudes toward the human right being violated. The test of this hypothesis is discussed next.

Hypothesis 3. For Hypothesis 3, I expected that people's tendency to tolerate the human rights violation as a function of the moral reprehensibility of the target's past transgression would hold over and above their previously reported attitudes toward humane treatment. This hypothesis was supported. The results showed that, although participants did tolerate the violation less the more they supported the right to humane treatment in the abstract, they tolerated the torture more in the high, compared to low,

moral reprehensibility scenario regardless of their abstract support for the right to humane treatment.

One explanation for this finding is that some people find it very difficult to ignore deservingness-related information. Research and theory on equity theory (Adams, 1965), belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980), and retributive justice (Darley, 2009) suggest that people have a strong motivation to see that individuals get what is deserved. Moreover, concerns about deservingness seem to be so ingrained that judgments about what is deserved might even be automatic (see Callan, Sutton, & Dovale, 2010; van den Bos, Peters, Bobocel, & Ybema, 2006). The automatic nature of deservingness judgments might mean that some people are unable to ignore deservingness-related information when responding to certain situations. In the context of the current thesis, even though many individuals believe that no one should ever be tortured, the deservingness-related aspects of a situation in which the right to protection against torture is violated might lead people to still tolerate torture in that instance.

This inability to ignore deservingness factors suggests that some people might show a discrepancy, supporting a human right in the abstract yet tolerating the violation of that right in certain situations. I address this issue in my discussion of Hypothesis 4.

Hypothesis 4. For Hypothesis 4, I expected that at least some people would show a discrepancy between their abstract attitudes toward human rights and their toleration of a human rights violation. Specifically, I expected that some people would support the right to humane treatment, but tolerate a violation of that right in at least one situation. My results supported this hypothesis. About 30% of participants who expressed support for the right to protection against torture and inhumane treatment were still willing to

tolerate a case of torture. Thus, having supportive attitudes toward a particular human right does not mean that an individual will not tolerate a violation of that right. If there is reason to believe that the target of a human rights violation deserved the treatment, then some people who support human rights in the abstract might still tolerate the human rights violation (see Staerklé & Clémence, 2004). However, simply observing that some participants were discrepant does not necessarily mean that they were discrepant due to deservingness considerations. Hypothesis 5 addressed this issue.

Hypothesis 5. I examined whether or not the discrepancy described in the previous section was greater when the target had committed a highly morally reprehensible transgression compared to a less reprehensible transgression (Hypothesis 5). Indeed, people were discrepant to a greater degree when the target had done something highly morally reprehensible in his past. This finding indicates that people who otherwise support a particular human right in the abstract might tolerate a violation of that right if there is sufficient reason to believe that the target deserved the treatment.

Implications of Hypotheses 1 to 5. The results from Part I of my thesis confirm previous findings that people are willing to tolerate or endorse human rights violations as a function of the reprehensibility of the target's behaviour (e.g., Carlsmith & Sood, 2009; Liberman, 2013; Staerklé & Clémence, 2004). The results of my study also add to this literature by showing direct evidence of one mechanism through which reprehensibility affects toleration; namely, the perceived deservingness of the target for the treatment that violates the right. People appear to make distinctions about whether or not a human rights violation is acceptable, and these distinctions are based in part on whether or not

the target is believed to deserve the treatment that violates his or her rights. Although this mechanism has been assumed in some past research, it has never been tested directly.

That people make deservingness-based distinctions about when a human rights violation is acceptable contrasts with existing procedural justice theories on what constitutes fair treatment. In the procedural justice literature, theorists have proposed that treating people politely and with respect is perceived as fair because such treatment makes the target feel like a valued member of the group (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Importantly, polite and respectful treatment, according to these theories, should be fair regardless of any individuating characteristics. However, procedural justice theories fail to take into account perceptions of deservingness and how these judgments might influence people's perceptions of procedural fairness. Treating people politely and with respect might only be seen as fair to the extent that the target is perceived to deserve such treatment. Research by Heuer, Blumenthal, Douglas, and Weinblatt (1999) supports this claim. Human rights violations are an extreme example of disrespectful or negative treatment. The results of the current study therefore add to Heuer et al.'s argument that procedural justice theorists should take perceived deservingness into account when making predictions about what treatment people believe is fair.

Not only do the findings of Part I of my thesis have implications for theories of procedural justice, they also have implications for preventing and reducing the toleration of human rights violations. The UDHR outlines fundamental rights (United Nations, 2014a). Tolerating the violation of these rights in some situations undermines a basic and crucial component of human rights; that they are universal and, thus, granted to everyone

without exception (United Nations, 2014a). Despite that these rights are supposed to be granted to everyone, the results of my thesis show that even people who endorse those rights do not necessarily treat them as universal, in that they will tolerate specific cases of human rights violations. These findings suggest one way to reduce toleration of human rights violations, at least among people who endorse universal human rights in the abstract. Specifically, people who endorse a particular right in an abstract sense could be made aware that their toleration of a particular human rights violation is discrepant from their abstract attitude. Under these conditions, people might recognize that their toleration of the human rights violation was hypocritical, leading them to reduce their toleration of the violation. In the second part of my thesis, I tested whether “inducing hypocrisy” is effective in changing how people respond to human rights violations.

Part II: A Possible Solution

For Part II of my thesis, I examined one potential method for reducing the toleration of a human rights violation. I attempted to induce hypocrisy in order to have participants realize that there was a discrepancy between their abstract support for human rights and their responses to human rights violations in specific situations. Similar to previous hypocrisy induction studies (e.g., Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone et al., 1997), I first had participants advocate support for human rights, then I exposed those in the hypocrisy induction condition to the discrepancy between the abstract position they just advocated and their situation-specific responses to a human rights violation (from Part I). Finally, I gave participants the opportunity to change their previous responses to a human rights violation, allowing them to make their situation-specific response more consistent with the position they had advocated. I also assessed how willing participants were to

help the target of the violation and to seek out further information on supporting human rights. The results from this experiment indicated that participants did not respond to the procedure entirely as expected. In the next few sections, I will discuss the findings for Hypotheses 6a to 6c, as well as the potential implications of these findings.

Findings for Hypotheses 6a to 6c. The hypocrisy induction procedure is designed to change attitudes and/or behaviour by inducing a state of negative arousal (i.e., psychological dissonance) in people who have behaved hypocritically in the past; that is, people who have behaved in a way that is discrepant from their abstract attitude on an issue. Thus, I expected participants in the hypocrisy condition to feel more negative arousal the more they tolerated the torture in Part I, because greater toleration meant participants were more discrepant from their previously stated, abstract support for the right not to be tortured. The relation between negative arousal and Part I toleration should not have occurred in the control group, where participants were not made to focus on their potentially discrepant reactions to the target's torture. The results of the analyses for the affect measure did not show the expected effect. Rather, the more participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the greater negative arousal they experienced, *regardless of condition*. This finding suggests that dissonance was aroused for discrepant individuals in both conditions, rather than in only the hypocrisy condition.

A possible reason that dissonance might have been aroused in both conditions is that participants responded to the torture scenarios just before writing the essays in support of the right to humane treatment. The essay task might have reminded participants in both conditions of their reactions to the torture in Part I. Therefore, in both conditions, participants who had been hypocritical might have been focussed on

their hypocritical reactions. The results for Hypotheses 6a to 6c are interpreted in light of this explanation for the affect results.

Hypothesis 6a. I expected that, among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would become less tolerant of the torture (when asked to respond to the same scenario again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition. Although there was a significant two-way interaction between Part I toleration and condition, the effect was in the opposite direction from my prediction. Of those participants who tolerated the torture in Part I, the participants in the control condition actually showed a greater reduction in their toleration than those in the hypocrisy condition.

One possible explanation for these results is that there was a consistency effect. Participants might have been motivated to be consistent with their previous responses to the scenarios when asked to respond again. Furthermore, participants in the hypocrisy condition were perhaps more able to be consistent because they had just been shown their answers for Part I. As a result, participants in the hypocrisy condition showed less change in their toleration of torture from Part I to Part II, compared to participants in the control condition.

Although a consistency bias might partially account for the findings regarding change in toleration, other results suggest that consistency bias is not the entire explanation. Several of the findings suggest that dissonance arising from hypocrisy induction might have played a role in reduced toleration of the target's torture. The more participants tolerated the torture the first time they responded to the scenarios (i.e., the more participants were discrepant or hypocritical) the more their toleration was reduced

the second time they responded to the scenarios. Also, the manipulation check results for the affect measure suggest that, the more participants tolerated the torture the first time they responded to the scenarios, the more dissonance they felt. Therefore, perhaps the reduction in toleration for hypocritical individuals was at least in part due to dissonance brought on by focussing on their hypocritical reactions (as a result of the writing task in both conditions).

It is interesting to note that the main effect for the degree to which participants tolerated the torture in Part I occurred for both changes in toleration of the torture and changes in perceived deservingness of the target for harsh treatment. That is, discrepant participants seemed to become less convinced that the target was deserving of harsh treatment and less tolerant of his torture, regardless of condition. However, the changes in perceived deservingness did not mediate the effect of Part I toleration on changes in toleration. This finding implies that the effect of Part I toleration was independent of changes in deservingness. Moreover, the results of the ancillary analyses for perceived morality indicated that the changes in toleration, as well as in deservingness, occurred without similar changes in perceptions of the target's morality. Participants were able to perceive the target as less deserving of torture and to tolerate the torture less than in Part I, but without also seeing him as more moral than in Part I. Taken together, these results imply that deservingness and toleration judgments can operate independent of perceptions of the target's morality. In addition, these results imply that people's motives for reducing their toleration of torture are based, at least in part, on factors that are independent of perceptions of the target's morality or deservingness.

I have argued in this section that the relation between Part I toleration of torture and reduction in toleration between Part I and Part II could have resulted in part from psychological dissonance arising from hypocrisy induction. However, this finding could also reflect a floor effect. Specifically, participants who tolerated the torture less in Part I did not have as much room on the scale to be able to reduce their toleration. Toleration was measured on a scale from 1 (low toleration) to 7 (high toleration). For the 29.6% of participants who both tolerated the torture and supported humane treatment in the abstract, the mean toleration for Part I was 4.67 ($SD = 0.66$). Because this mean was near the middle of the scale, there was plenty of room for participants to reduce their toleration when they responded to the scenario again in Part II. However, for participants who supported the right to humane treatment in the abstract and did *not* tolerate the torture in Part I, the mean toleration for Part I was 1.91 ($SD = 0.89$). Given that this mean is near the low endpoint of the scale, these participants had very little room to reduce their toleration when responding to the scenario again in Part II. Thus, there could have been a floor effect for Part II toleration for those who were low in Part I toleration.

The possible combination of hypocrisy, floor, and consistency effects makes the results for change in toleration difficult to interpret. However, participants only responded to the items regarding their willingness to help the target once, after the hypocrisy manipulation. Therefore, the results for Hypothesis 6b should not have been susceptible to the same consistency problems as the results for Hypothesis 6a. Furthermore, the scores on the willingness to help composite were not as close to the end of the response scale as were the scores for Part I toleration. Thus, floor effects can also

be ruled out. For these reasons, the results for Hypothesis 6b are a better indicator of the effectiveness of the hypocrisy induction procedure than the results for Hypothesis 6a.

Hypothesis 6b. I expected that, among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would be more willing to help the target of the human rights violation (when asked to respond to the same scenario again) if they were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition. The results supported my hypothesis.

Although I found the predicted interaction, the affect results caused me to question whether the underlying reason for the pattern of results was as I had originally proposed. The affect results suggested that, in both conditions, the more participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the more they experienced hypocrisy-related dissonance. If this was the case, and dissonance increased hypocritical participants' willingness to help the target of torture, then the more participants tolerated the torture in Part I, the more they should have been willing to help the target of torture, regardless of condition. However, the relation between Part I toleration and willingness to help occurred only for participants in the hypocrisy condition, not the control condition.

One possible explanation for these results is that participants in the control condition, because attention was not drawn to their hypocrisy, were not as motivated to compensate for their discrepant behaviour. When it is not clear that someone else has noticed the hypocrisy, participants might not want to draw attention to their previously hypocritical behaviour by compensating for it (Gaffney, Hogg, Cooper, & Stone, 2012). In the hypocrisy condition for the present study, participants were shown their hypocritical responses from Part I, possibly indicating to them that their hypocrisy had

been noticed (by the experimenter) and motivating them to compensate for their hypocrisy. Because participants in the control condition were not shown their responses, they might have had the impression that their hypocrisy went unnoticed, making them less motivated to compensate for the hypocrisy. This interpretation of the findings for Hypothesis 6b suggests that participants might be more motivated to reduce their hypocritical toleration of a human rights violation if they believe that others have noticed their hypocrisy.

Finally, the ancillary analyses regarding changes in participants' perceptions that the target deserved harsh treatment and their perceptions of the morality of the target are interesting in light of the above effects for willingness to help the target. The ancillary analyses suggest that any hypocrisy-induced effect that occurred on participants' willingness to help the target was not mediated by changes in these perceptions (see the discussion for Hypothesis 6a).

In addition to looking at whether participants *intended* to behave in support of human rights (in this case, by helping a target of torture), it was also important to look at whether or not they *actually* behaved in support of human rights. Although people's intentions to behave a certain way are important in determining how they actually behave, these intentions do not always lead to corresponding behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). For this reason, I also looked at the effect of the hypocrisy manipulation on participants' behaviour in relation to human rights.

Hypothesis 6c. I expected that, among participants who supported the right to humane treatment, those who tolerated the torture in one of the scenarios in Part I would be more likely to ask for additional information about supporting human rights if they

were in the hypocrisy condition than if they were in the control condition. The results of the test of this hypothesis were not consistent with my prediction, nor were they similar to the findings from tests of Hypotheses 6a and 6b. Participants were more likely to ask for information about supporting human rights in the hypocrisy condition, but this did not differ based on their toleration of torture in Part I.

One possible explanation for these results is that participants were more likely to ask for additional information in the hypocrisy condition because they were asked to think about human rights more than were participants in the control condition. Specifically, participants in the hypocrisy condition wrote an additional part of the essay, therefore, they would have been focusing on human rights for a longer period of time than participants in the control condition, who only wrote the first part of the essay. It is possible that having participants in the hypocrisy condition elaborate more on why it is important to support human rights made them more interested in or curious about universal human rights, which increased how likely they were to ask for additional information on supporting human rights.

The results for this hypothesis might indicate that having people reflect on the importance of human rights for a longer period of time makes them more likely to act in support of universal human rights. However, given that these results are not consistent with any of the other results for Part II, they should be interpreted with caution.

Implications of Hypotheses 6a to 6c. With respect to the hypocrisy induction literature, the results of the current study suggest that certain procedures will be less likely to show unambiguous evidence of hypocrisy induction effects. For example, it is important to leave enough time between people's initial hypocritical responses and the

hypocrisy induction procedure to avoid the consistency effects that might have been at play in the current study. Past studies on hypocrisy induction did not have participants committing the hypocritical behaviour directly before the hypocrisy induction procedure (e.g., Son Hing et al., 2002; Stone et al., 1997), which is likely why problems with consistency effects have not been previously reported in this literature. In addition, a relatively long period of time between participants' hypocritical behaviours and the hypocrisy manipulation will help ensure that hypocrisy is not inadvertently induced in the control group, as appears to have been the case in the present study.

Despite some ambiguous and inconsistent results, the findings as a whole suggest that hypocrisy induction might be effective for encouraging people to respond to human rights violations in a way that is consistent with their abstract support for the given right. Assuming that some of the findings in Part II were due to hypocrisy induction, the results could also have important implications for how such initiatives aimed at reducing toleration of human rights violations are implemented. For example, the results suggest that drawing attention to people's hypocrisy might be necessary to motivate people to compensate for their hypocrisy by responding in a way that supports their abstract endorsement of human rights. People's motivation might be heightened under these conditions because they believe that others have noticed their discrepant responses.

Another practical implication of the findings for Part II is that decreased toleration of human rights violations might occur independent of changes in the perceived deservingness of the target for treatment that violates his or her rights. Similarly, decreased toleration of human rights might occur independent of people's views on the morality of the target and his or her behaviour. Thus, techniques aimed at reducing

toleration of human rights violations do not necessarily have to convince people that targets of rights violations are good people or deserve good treatment.

Finally, there was more evidence that hypocrisy induction was effective for the measures of toleration and willingness to help the target of the human rights violation than there was for the behaviour measure. These findings imply that attempts to influence responses to human rights violations, even if effective, might not lead to similar behaviours supporting human rights. Theories of the link between social justice attitudes and social action (e.g., van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004) will be helpful in addressing this issue in further research.

Limitations and Future Directions

The current study had a few limitations that should be noted when considering the implications of the results. It is important to note, for example, that the sample for the current study was overwhelmingly female (approximately 88%). Although sex differences have not been noted in similar studies (e.g., Carlsmith & Sood, 2009), it would be useful to replicate the current findings using a more representative sample.

Additionally, the scenarios about human rights focused on one specific human rights violation (i.e., torture). It is unclear whether my results for Part I could be generalized to other types of human rights violations. The right to humane treatment was used in the current study because responses to violations of this right were expected to be particularly relevant to deservingness. It is possible, though, that deservingness would not be considered for violations of other rights outlined in the UDHR (United Nations, 2014a). For example, deservingness might be less relevant when people make judgments about specific violations of women's right to education. Future research on reactions to

human rights violations should explore whether the same pattern of results is found for violations of human rights other than the protection against torture.

Other contextual factors related to how the violation was depicted in the scenario might make it difficult to generalize to other instances of human rights violations.

Canadian participants read about an Afghani man who had previous ties to extremist groups. Responses might have differed if participants had read about someone with a similar nationality or someone who did not have ties to extremist groups; both of these characteristics could influence factors such as dehumanization (Newheiser, Sawaoka, & Dovidio, 2012). If the target is dehumanized, then people might more readily believe that the target is deserving of negative treatment, such as torture. Future studies could explore how information about the similarity or dissimilarity of the target affects the relationship between deservingness considerations and toleration.

A few limitations are specific to Part II of the current study. As mentioned earlier, dissonance appeared to be aroused in both the hypocrisy and control conditions, likely due to the short period of time between participants' hypocritical responses and the essay task. Future research could solve this problem by running the study over two sessions, separated by several days. In the first session, participants would rate their abstract support for a particular human right and respond to specific violations of that right. Participants who supported the human right in the abstract would be called back to the second session, in which they would be randomly assigned to a hypocrisy induction or control condition.

The results of the current study suggest that people can be induced to decrease their toleration of human rights violations independent of deservingness considerations.

Future research could explore methods that directly attempt to decrease people's tendency to focus on deservingness considerations, methods that reach even those who are opposed to certain human rights in the abstract. One potential method, as suggested by Hafer (2011), would be to encourage people to focus on "entitlement" rather than on "deservingness," where entitlement is based on adherence to formal or informal rules rather than contextual factors (Feather, 2003). For example, people could be persuaded that, although an individual seems *deserving* of treatment that violates his or her rights, she or he is nevertheless *entitled* to those rights as a function of a formal human rights code. Strengthening social norms associated with entitlement to universal human rights would help people put concern for entitlement ahead of deservingness considerations. One way to increase the sense that entitlement to universal human rights is normative is to make people more aware of international human rights law, which suggests that most countries are in favour of such entitlements.

Additionally, it is possible that, regardless of the method, getting people to reduce their toleration of human rights violations could eventually lead to changes on an international level. If people are motivated to act in support of universal human rights, then it is likely that they will push their leaders also to act in support of human rights. It is important to note that, at this time, not all countries have ratified all of the rights outlined in the UDHR (United Nations, 2014b). Public pressure on leaders, from their own citizens, to act in support of human rights could increase leaders' willingness to ratify and endorse the rights outlined in the UDHR.

General Conclusions

Overall, the results of the current study indicate that people tolerate human rights violations on the basis of deservingness. Moreover, toleration based on deservingness occurs over and above, and even in opposition to, people's abstract support for human rights. It is possible that a procedure similar to hypocrisy induction might help reduce this toleration of human rights violations. The current findings suggest that such initiatives might be particularly effective if they draw attention to people's hypocritical toleration of human rights violations, perhaps because people will feel that others have noticed their hypocritical toleration.

Unfortunately, despite a generally positive attitude toward universal human rights, many individuals still tolerate specific violations of these rights. Although much more work is needed, the current study is an initial step in addressing this important issue.

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APPENDIX A: Informed Consent Letters

[Letter for the First Study]

Date: October 2013

Project Title: Personal Opinions about Current Events

Principal Investigator: Dr. Carolyn Hafer, Professor of Social Psychology

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INVITATION

You are invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to investigate people's opinions on a variety of general topics, as well as their reactions to specific news stories.

WHAT'S INVOLVED

As a participant, you will be asked to rate several statements related to your opinions of people, the world in general, and various social issues. Additionally, you will be asked to read a few summaries of news stories and then respond to several questions about what you read. Participation will take approximately 30 minutes of your time.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS

Possible benefits of participation include a first-hand experience of what social science research involves for the participants. The researchers will also benefit from a more complete understanding of how people look at and react to certain social issues. There also may be risks associated with participation, as you might be uncomfortable with the situation presented in the new stories. Please note that such emotional discomfort is expected to be no more than that experienced by reading a newspaper or watching news on television.

CONFIDENTIALITY

All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included with your responses or in any other way associated with the data collected in the study. Furthermore, because our interest is in the average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be identified individually in any way in written reports of this research. Data collected during this study will be stored indefinitely on a computer in the social psychology laboratory at Brock University. Access to these data will be restricted to Dr. Carolyn Hafer and her colleagues, as well as her research students at Brock University.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION

Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or participate in any component of the study. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time and may do so without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. Please note that once the questionnaires are completed they are anonymous and therefore impossible to remove from the data should you wish to withdraw after completing your participation.

PUBLICATION OF RESULTS

Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. Feedback about this study will be available after September 2014. Participants who wish to receive information about the findings of this study at that time can e-mail chafer@brocku.ca or cd11da@brocku.ca.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE

If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact Dr. Carolyn Hafer or Caroline Drolet using the contact information provided above. This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University [insert file #]. If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Brock University Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca.

CONSENT

I agree to participate in this study described above for 30 minutes of research credit. I have made this decision based on the information I have read in this Information Consent Letter. I have the opportunity to receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or the Brock University Research Ethics Office. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time by simply exiting the questionnaire before I am finished. Sign below if you agree to participate in the study.

Name (printed)

Signature

Date

[The researcher will keep this portion and participants will keep the rest of the form.]

CONSENT

I agree to participate in this study described above for 30 minutes of research credit. I have made this decision based on the information I have read in this Information Consent Letter. I have the opportunity to receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or the Brock University Research Ethics Office. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time by simply exiting the questionnaire before I am finished. Sign below if you agree to participate in the study.

Name (printed)

Signature

Date

[Letter for the Second Study]

Date: October 2014

Project Title: Emotions and Persuasive Writing Style

Principal Investigator: Dr. Carolyn Hafer, Professor of Social Psychology

Department of Psychology

Brock University

(905) 688-5550 Ext. 4297; chafer@brocku.ca

INVITATION

You are invited to participate in a study that involves research. The purpose of this study is to investigate the link between people's emotions and their ability to write persuasively on a variety of general topics.

WHAT'S INVOLVED

As a participant, you will be asked to write a persuasive essay on one of several topics. Additionally, you will be asked to rate the extent to which various characteristics apply to you. Participation will take approximately 30 minutes of your time.

POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND RISKS

Possible benefits of participation include a first-hand experience of what social science research involves for the participants. The researchers will also benefit from a more complete understanding of how people think about human rights and why it is important to support them. There are no expected risks associated with completing this task.

CONFIDENTIALITY

All information you provide is considered confidential; your name will not be included with your responses or in any other way associated with the data collected in the study. Furthermore, because our interest is in the average responses of the entire group of participants, you will not be identified individually in any way in written reports of this research. Data collected during this study will be stored indefinitely on a computer in the social psychology laboratory at Brock University. Access to these data will be restricted to Dr. Carolyn Hafer and her colleagues, as well as her research students at Brock University.

VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION

Participation in this study is voluntary. If you wish, you may decline to answer any questions or participate in any component of the study. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time and may do so without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled. Please note that once the questionnaires are completed they are anonymous and therefore impossible to remove from the data should you wish to withdraw after completing your participation.

PUBLICATION OF RESULTS

Results of this study may be published in professional journals and presented at conferences. Feedback about this study will be available after September 2014. Participants who wish to receive information about the findings of this study at that time can e-mail chafer@brocku.ca.

CONTACT INFORMATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE

If you have any questions about this study or require further information, please contact Dr. Carolyn Hafer using the contact information provided above. This study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the Research Ethics Board at Brock University [insert file #]. If

you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Brock University Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca.

CONSENT

I agree to participate in this study described above for 30 minutes of research credit. I have made this decision based on the information I have read in this Information Consent Letter. I have the opportunity to receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or the Brock University Research Ethics Office. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time by simply exiting the questionnaire before I am finished. Sign below if you agree to participate in the study.

Name (printed)

Signature

Date

[The researcher will keep this portion and participants will keep the rest of the form.]

CONSENT

I agree to participate in this study described above for 30 minutes of research credit. I have made this decision based on the information I have read in this Information Consent Letter. I have the opportunity to receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or the Brock University Research Ethics Office. I understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time by simply exiting the questionnaire before I am finished. Sign below if you agree to participate in the study.

Name (printed)

Signature

Date

APPENDIX B: Participant ID and Demographic Information

This is your Participant ID for this study {random ID shown here}

What is your sex? _____

What is your age in years? _____

APPENDIX C: Short Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale and Human Rights Items

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement by selecting a number on the scale that is provided. Please remember that your first responses are usually the most accurate.

Please answer the next few items using the scale below.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|----------------------|---|---|---------|---|---|--|
| Strongly Disagree | | | Neutral | | | Strongly Agree |
| _____ | | | | | | Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. |
| _____ | | | | | | Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. |
| _____ | | | | | | There are many radical, immoral people in our country today who are trying to ruin it for their godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. |
| _____ | | | | | | Human rights should be universal, meaning they are granted to everyone (e.g., regardless of race, gender, behaviour, sexual orientation). ^{HR} |
| _____ | | | | | | Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. |
| _____ | | | | | | The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest methods would be justified if they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path. |
| _____ | | | | | | Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it makes them different from everyone else. |
| _____ | | | | | | People should pay less attention to the Bible and the other old traditional forms of religious guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral. |
| _____ | | | | | | The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas. |
| _____ | | | | | | No one should ever be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment for any reason. ^{HR} |
| _____ | | | | | | There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. |
| _____ | | | | | | What our country really needs, instead of more "civil rights" is a good, stiff dose of law and order. |
| _____ | | | | | | Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the "normal way" things are supposed to be done. |
| _____ | | | | | | The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show that we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and trouble-makers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order. |

^{HR} indicates a human rights related item.

APPENDIX D: Social Dominance Orientation Scale

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement by selecting a number on the scale that is provided. Please remember that your first responses are usually the most accurate.

Please answer the next few items using the scale below.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|----------------------|---|---|---------|---|---|---|
| Strongly Disagree | | | Neutral | | | Strongly Agree |
| _____ | | | | | | Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. |
| _____ | | | | | | In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. |
| _____ | | | | | | It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. |
| _____ | | | | | | To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. |
| _____ | | | | | | If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. |
| _____ | | | | | | It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. |
| _____ | | | | | | Inferior groups should stay in their place. |
| _____ | | | | | | Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. |
| _____ | | | | | | It would be good if groups could be equal. |
| _____ | | | | | | Group equality should be our ideal. |
| _____ | | | | | | All groups should be given an equal chance in life. |
| _____ | | | | | | We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. |
| _____ | | | | | | Increased social equality. |
| _____ | | | | | | We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. |
| _____ | | | | | | We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. |
| _____ | | | | | | No one group should dominate in society. |

APPENDIX E: Preference for Consistency Scale

Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement by using the scale that is provided. Please remember that your first responses are usually the most accurate

Please answer the next few items using the scale below.

| | | | | | | | | |
|----------|---|---|---|---------|---|---|---|----------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
| Strongly | | | | Neutral | | | | Strongly |
| Disagree | | | | | | | | Agree |

- _____ I prefer to be around people whose reactions I can anticipate.
- _____ It is important to me that my actions are consistent with my beliefs.
- _____ Even if my attitudes and actions seemed consistent with one another to me, it would bother me if they did not seem consistent in the eyes of others.
- _____ It is important to me that those who know me can predict what I will do.
- _____ I want to be described by others as a stable, predictable person.
- _____ Admirable people are consistent and predictable.
- _____ The appearance of consistency is an important part of the image I present to the world.
- _____ It bothers me when someone I depend on is unpredictable.
- _____ I don't like to appear as if I am inconsistent.
- _____ I get uncomfortable when I find my behaviour contradicts my beliefs.
- _____ An important requirement for any friend of mine is personal consistency.
- _____ I typically prefer to do things the same way.
- _____ I dislike people who are constantly changing their opinions.
- _____ I want my close friends to be predictable.
- _____ It is important to me that others view me as a stable person.
- _____ I make an effort to appear consistent to others.
- _____ I'm uncomfortable holding two beliefs that are inconsistent.
- _____ It doesn't bother me much if my actions are inconsistent.

APPENDIX F: Scenarios

[Instructions]

We are interested in how people respond to different types of current events. We have written brief summaries of many different kinds of current events based on actual news stories. You will read 6 of these.

In your case, in order to give you a broad range of stories, two of the stories are about forest fires, two are about car accidents, and two are about interrogations in Afghanistan.

Please read each story carefully as you will be asked to answer some questions about what happened.

[Torture with Minor Transgression Scenario]

Topic of the Story: Interrogation

Person Described: Ahmad Farid

Farid was detained on suspicion of having information about terrorist activities. He was captured while tending goats in close proximity to a Taliban camp. It was later discovered that during his teen years Farid was a member of an extremist Muslim group for three years, starting in 2005. During this time, Farid was involved in an ambush that left four Canadian army soldiers with minor injuries. He had not been in contact with the group responsible for the ambush for a few years prior to his recent detainment. Despite that Farid has repeatedly said that he does not know any useful information about nearby terrorist groups, he was believed to have overheard useful information and was interrogated based on this assumption. During the interrogation, he was tortured and, as a result, was left with lasting physical and emotional scars.

[Torture with Serious Transgression Scenario]

Topic of the Story: Interrogation

Person Described: Yasir Sahad

Sahad was arrested because he was believed to have information about terrorist activities. He was captured while harvesting wheat close to an insurgent encampment. Officials later found that, as a teenager, Sahad had been an active member of the insurgency until 2008. While he was a member of the insurgency he was involved in an attack as a sniper, during which time he shot and killed four elementary school children to create a distraction and allow the other insurgents to get into position. He cut off contact with this group several years before his recent arrest. Since the time of his arrest, Sahad has continued to deny that he has any helpful information about nearby terrorist organizations, but he was believed to have overheard something useful. Based on this assumption, he was subjected to an “enhanced” interrogation, which involved torture and left him with permanent physical and psychological damage.

[Filler Scenario 1—Forest Fire]

Topic of the Story: Forest Fire

Person Described: Jack Reynolds

Reynolds was pronounced dead after being transported to the ER from the scene of a serious forest fire. Despite the dry conditions, park and wildlife officials decided to begin a controlled burn with the intent to avoid an out of control fire later. Those who lived in the area were told that the burn was going to take place. Because Reynolds was camping in the woods nearby, he never heard about the controlled burn. Within 24 hours, the winds picked up, making the fire burn uncontrollably. People living in the area were told to evacuate. Because Reynolds was still camping at the time, he did not hear the evacuation alert. He was trapped in the fire while fleeing his campsite. He received serious burns in the fire and died shortly after being rescued.

[Filler Scenario 2—Forest Fire]

Topic of the Story: Forest Fire

Person Described: Mark Johnson

Johnson was hospitalized after being caught in an out of control forest fire. Although it had been a particularly dry summer, the park and wildlife officials decided to start a controlled burn in order to avoid having an out of control forest fire in the future. Nearby residents were notified about the controlled burn and were warned that they may need to evacuate if the situation were to get out of hand. Johnson had been camping in the woods near his home at the time, and did not know about the situation. After only a day, the winds in the area picked up and caused the fire to spread uncontrollably. Residents were told to evacuate as soon as possible. Johnson was not aware that an evacuation had been ordered and was caught in the fire as he tried to run to safety. He sustained severe burns and is currently in critical condition.

[Filler Scenario 3—Car Accident]

Topic of the Story: Car Accident

Person Described: Jenna West

An ambulance rushed West to the hospital after she was hit by a semi truck while she was standing on the shoulder of the highway. She is currently in critical condition. She stopped her car after witnessing an accident and was helping one of the drivers out of a wrecked vehicle when she was hit by an oncoming semi truck. The truck did not stop, so police do not know who was responsible for the accident. Because of the clear skies that morning it was extremely sunny, so the truck driver likely did not see West at all. Also, due to the large size of the truck, the driver probably did not realize that he had hit anyone. West is currently in a coma and doctors are uncertain about her chances at recovery.

[Filler Scenario 4—Car Accident]

Topic of the Story: Car Accident

Person Described: Sarah Smith

Smith was taken to the emergency room after being hit by a truck while she was on the side of the road. Smith had stopped after her car stalled on the highway. She was able to get it onto the shoulder and determine that the engine failure was the result of Smith failing to get the oil changed last month. She was on her phone with a mechanic discussing repairs when she was struck by a semi truck. It had been very sunny that morning and the driver had probably been blinded by the sun, so he probably did not even see Smith or realize that he hit her. Police currently do not know the identity of the driver who was responsible for the crash. Smith is currently unconscious and doctors are unsure about her likelihood of waking up.

APPENDIX G: Torture Scenario Response Items

The next few questions are about your reactions to this event. There are no right or wrong answers; we are simply interested in people's individual opinions.

[Section 1: Toleration Items]

Please answer the next three items using the scale below.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|--------------------------|--|---|---------|---|---|-------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | | | Neutral | | | Strongly Agree |
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | The methods used in [Farid/Sahad]'s interrogation were appropriate | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | The way [Farid/Sahad] was treated during the interrogation was justified | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | The use of torture in the interrogation of [Farid/Sahad] was acceptable. | | | | | |

[Section 2: Deservingness Items]

Please answer the next four items using the scale below.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|--------------------------|---|---|---------|---|---|-------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | | | Neutral | | | Strongly Agree |
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | [Farid/Sahad] deserved to be treated harshly. | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | [Farid/Sahad] deserved to be punished. | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | [Farid/Sahad] deserved to be tortured. | | | | | |

[Section 3: Good/Moral Person and Good/Moral Behaviour Items]

Please answer the next four items using the scale below.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|--------------------------|--|---|---------|---|---|--------------------|
| Very Bad/Immoral | | | Neutral | | | Very Good/Moral |
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | To what extent do you think [Farid/Sahad] is a good or bad person? | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | To what extent do you think [Farid/Sahad] is a moral or immoral person? | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | To what extent do you think [Farid/Sahad]'s past behaviour was good or bad? | | | | | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | To what extent do you think [Farid/Sahad]'s past behaviour was moral or immoral? | | | | | |

[Section 4: Likelihood of Having Important Information]

Please answer the next item using the drop down menu.

On a scale from 0% (no chance) to 100% (definitely), rate how likely you think it is that [Farid/Sahad] was withholding information about terrorist activities.

{drop down menu with values from 0%-100% shown here}

APPENDIX H: Filler Scenario Response Items

****In keeping with the story that some pages have not been displayed correctly, the response items for one of the filler scenarios will be displayed without the last two questions (i.e., those asking about supporting the person in the story).****

The next few questions are about your reactions to this case. There are no right or wrong answers; we are simply interested in people's individual opinions.

(Fire Scenarios)

Please answer the next three items using the scale below.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|----------------------|---|---|---------|---|---|-------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | | | Neutral | | | Strongly Agree |
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| _____ | [Johnson/Reynolds] deserved to be caught in the fire. | | | | | |
| _____ | [Johnson/Reynolds] deserved to be hurt. | | | | | |
| _____ | [Johnson/Reynolds] did not deserve to be trapped in the fire. | | | | | |

Please answer the next four items using the scale below.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---------------------|--|---|---------|---|---|--------------------|
| Very Bad/Immoral | | | Neutral | | | Very Good/Moral |
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| _____ | To what extent do you think [Johnson/Reynolds] is a good or bad person? | | | | | |
| _____ | To what extent do you think [Johnson/Reynolds] is a moral or immoral person? | | | | | |
| _____ | To what extent do you think [Johnson/Reynolds]'s behaviour was good or bad? | | | | | |
| _____ | To what extent do you think [Johnson/Reynolds]'s behaviour was moral or immoral? | | | | | |

The next questions are about your willingness to support [Johnson/Reynolds] in a couple different ways.

Please answer the next four items using the scale below.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|-----------------------|--|---|---------|---|---|-----------------------|
| Not at All Willing | | | Neutral | | | Completely Willing |
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| _____ | It is not uncommon for cases like [Johnson/Reynolds]'s to become the subject of negligence lawsuits against park and wildlife officials. If [Johnson/Reynolds]'s case were brought to trial, how willing would you be to make a donation to help cover the legal fees? | | | | | |
| _____ | Cases like [Johnson/Reynolds]'s often catch the attention of various fire safety organizations. How willing would you be to write a letter opposing the use of the controlled burn that injured [Johnson/Reynolds]? | | | | | |

(Car Accident Scenarios)

Please answer the next three items using the scale below.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|----------------------|---|---|---------|---|---|-------------------|
| Strongly Disagree | | | Neutral | | | Strongly Agree |
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| _____ | [West/Smith] deserved to be hit by a truck. | | | | | |
| _____ | [West/Smith] deserved to be hurt. | | | | | |
| _____ | [West/Smith] did not deserve to be in a coma. | | | | | |

Please answer the next four items using the scale below.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---------------------|--|---|---------|---|---|--------------------|
| Very Bad/Immoral | | | Neutral | | | Very Good/Moral |
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| _____ | To what extent do you think [West/Smith] is a good or bad person? | | | | | |
| _____ | To what extent do you think [West/Smith] is a moral or immoral person? | | | | | |
| _____ | To what extent do you think [West/Smith]'s behaviour was good or bad? | | | | | |
| _____ | To what extent do you think [West/Smith]'s behaviour was moral or immoral? | | | | | |

The next questions are about your willingness to support [West/Smith] in a couple different ways.

Please answer the next four items using the scale below.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|-----------------------|---|---|---------|---|---|-----------------------|
| Not at All Willing | | | Neutral | | | Completely Willing |
| <hr/> | | | | | | |
| _____ | It is not uncommon for cases like [West/Smith]'s to become the subject of lawsuits. If [West/Smith]'s case were brought to trial, how willing would you be to make a donation to help cover the legal fees? | | | | | |

_____ Cases like [West/Smith]'s often catch the attention of various traffic safety organizations. How willing would you be to write a letter supporting the creation of new driving laws that would help prevent accidents like the one that put [West/Smith] in a coma?

APPENDIX I: Attention Check/Discrepancy Score Item

The following question will be used to determine how closely you are paying attention.

Which of the following values is the highest? If more than one value is tied for the highest, pick the first of these values that appears in the list.

- (1) {Discrepancy score for torture with minor transgression scenario}
- (2) {Discrepancy score for torture with serious transgression scenario}
- (3) {Discrepancy score for torture with minor transgression scenario-1}
- (4) {Discrepancy score for torture with serious transgression scenario-1}

*Participants had to choose option (1) or (2) to continue. If participants did not select options 1 or 2, the survey registered that they made an error and asked them to try again—the way the question was set up, the highest value was always option 1 and/or 2.

APPENDIX J: Support for Human Rights Writing Task

We are interested in how people think about human rights and why they are motivated to support universal human rights. For this task, you are being asked to write a persuasive essay about why you believe it is important to support human rights. Excerpts from your essay might be featured in promotional materials being dispersed on campus to promote support for human rights and to inform people why universal human rights are important.

Universal human rights are rights that are granted to everyone (e.g., regardless of race, gender, behaviour, sexual orientation, and so on) and are described in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948). This document claims that every person has the right to such things as access to adequate medical care, participation in the political process, and humane treatment. In order to better understand what motivates people to support universal human rights, we would like you to write a short essay (about one paragraph) about how people benefit from human rights. There are several different rights about which we are asking people to write. The one that has been assigned to you is displayed below.

Human Right Description: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.”

APPENDIX K: Hypocrisy Condition Information

To get a better understanding of how people think about human rights, we have an additional question about your thoughts and opinions related to human rights.

In order to better understand why people might not support universal human rights, we would like you to write a short essay (about one paragraph) about a situation in which you might feel conflicted about supporting a human right. You will be writing about the same human right as in Part 1. In order to help you think of an example of when you might feel conflicted about supporting this right, we have chosen one of the scenarios related to human rights from the previous study for you to use to come up with ideas. The scenario and your responses are displayed below.

Human Right Description: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.”

{Scenario and associated responses were shown here.}

APPENDIX L: Affect Measure

Please rate the extent to which these terms describe your current state after writing the human rights persuasive essays.

| | | | | | | |
|----------|---|---|---------|---|---|-----------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Does Not | | | Neutral | | | Applies |
| Apply at | | | | | | Very Much |
| All | | | | | | |

[Negative Emotions about the Self]

_____ Angry at myself

_____ Guilty

_____ Annoyed with myself

_____ Disgusted with myself

_____ Regretful

_____ Shameful

_____ Self-critical

[Negative Emotions about Other]

_____ Angry at others

_____ Irritated at others

_____ Disgusted with others

[Discomfort]

_____ Fearful

_____ Uneasy

_____ Embarrassed

_____ Bothered

_____ Tense

_____ Threatened

_____ Uncomfortable

[Positive Emotions]

_____ Friendly

_____ Happy

_____ Energetic

_____ Optimistic

_____ Content

_____ Good

[Depressed]

_____ Low

_____ Depressed

_____ Sad


_____ Helpless

_____ Anxious


_____ Frustrated

APPENDIX M: Error Message


[After clicking “Submit” the participant will be taken to the following screen for 5 seconds.]



[After 5 seconds, the survey will move to the next page and show the following alert.]



[The participant will click “OK” and then they will see the following message.]



APPENDIX N: Behavioural Intention Items

(For torture scenarios)

The next two questions are about your willingness to support [Farid/Sahad] against the people who interrogated him. Please answer the next items using the scale below.

| | | | | | | |
|------------|---|---|---------|---|---|------------|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| Not at All | | | Neutral | | | Completely |
| Willing | | | | | | Willing |

_____ It is not uncommon for interrogations like [Farid/Sahad]'s to become the subject of lawsuits claiming that those who were interrogated were treated inhumanely. If [Farid/Sahad]'s case were brought to trial, how willing would you be to make a donation to help cover his legal fees?

_____ Cases like [Farid/Sahad]'s often catch the attention of various anti-violence organizations. How willing would you be to write a letter opposing the treatment [Farid/Sahad] received during his interrogation?

APPENDIX O: Verbal Protocol for Debriefing

I want to explain the work we're doing in a little more detail before you go today. Do you have anything you would like to ask before I start? *{Record questions on the debriefing notes sheet}*

I have a couple of questions for you that will help us assess if the procedures need to be changed in future studies. During any of the research you participated in today, was there anything unclear about the instructions or any of the procedures? Did anything seem odd or strange about the instructions or any other part of the research? Can you explain in your own words what you think this study is about? *{Make notes on answers; tell them they are on the right track if they answer the last question}*

Now I'm going to tell you about the purpose of the research in more detail.

As you know, in Study 1 we are interested in people's reactions to news stories. More specifically, we are interested in how people respond to scenarios about human rights violations. Two of the scenarios you read for Study 1 described a violation of the right to protection against torture (that is, the right to humane treatment). In these scenarios, the past behaviour of the man was different; one scenario was about a man who had caused minor harm to soldiers and the other scenario was about a man who had caused serious harm to children. We predicted that participants would be more willing to tolerate the rights violation when the man had caused serious harm. We think that this is because people will feel that the man in this case deserves treatment that violates his rights. So, in general, we think that people will tolerate a violation of human rights if they think the person deserves such treatment. We also predicted that some participants would tolerate the rights violation when the man caused serious harm to children, *even if* they support human rights overall; that is, we predicted that some people would be inconsistent in their support for human rights. This is why we asked you a few questions in the beginning of Study 1 about your general support for human rights.

I need to tell you that all of the scenarios for Study 1 were fictional, although some of the events they depicted were taken from actual news stories. We want people to believe the stories are actual events so that their responses are more realistic.

Study 2, as you know, was about writing persuasive essays. Specifically, we are interested in how the writing task affects people's reactions to the kind of human rights violation you read about in Study 1. This is how the study works. There are two versions of the writing task, and you were given one of these. One version asked participants to write about a time when they might feel conflicted about supporting human rights. Participants wrote about this conflict while looking at the particular scenario from Study 1 where they showed the most inconsistency. By inconsistency, I mean when a participant says they support human rights generally, but then agree with the inhumane way the man is treated in the scenario. Usually, this happens with the scenario where the man caused serious harm to children, because this is where people tend to tolerate the man's torture, even when they support human rights in general. The second version of the writing task asked participants to write an essay about the right to humane treatment, but did not connect the right with their responses to the scenarios in Study 1. We predicted that many participants who do the first version of the writing task will see an inconsistency between their general support for human rights and their toleration of the human rights violation—this should *not* be the case for participants who do the second version of the writing task. We also predicted that participants who see an inconsistency will reduce their toleration of human rights violations so that they are more consistent with their overall support

for human rights. We tested this prediction in a couple of ways. You were asked to complete a portion of the first study for a second time. Those who felt they behaved inconsistently with respect to human rights should tolerate the violation less this second time compared to when they had first read and responded to the scenarios. You probably remember the error screen that asked you to complete part of the first study again. We deliberately put up the error screen as an excuse to get participants to fill out these questions again. We do not want participants to know we are interested in how their responses might change from Study 1 to Study 2; if they knew, it might affect how they answer the questions.

Also, before coming out into the hall, you were given a slip of paper on which you could write your email if you wanted more information on supporting human rights. We predicted that those who felt that they behaved inconsistently would be more likely to ask for information than those who did not feel they were inconsistent. We tear up everyone's email address at the end of the day and, instead, everyone gets information for several human rights organizations on the printed debriefing form. Your email will be in no way associated with any of your data in this study—all of your responses are anonymous, like it said in the consent form. One last point about the procedure for Study 2 I have to explain. You were told that your responses might be used in promotional materials on campus. However, I want you to understand that your responses will not, in any way, be used outside of analysing the results of this study. Your responses will remain confidential and will not be shared with anyone. The reason we tell participants that their responses might be used in promotional materials is that past research has shown that people who have been inconsistent in how they respond to some issue are more bothered by that inconsistency if they think they will have to publicly state what they believe, rather than just saying what they believe to themselves.

Remember that there are no right or wrong ways to respond to anything in the studies you took part in today. Everyone has their own beliefs about things, and those beliefs should be respected.

Do you have any questions about anything I have told you so far?

Now I want to explain why we didn't tell you everything about the purpose and the procedure of the research until the study was over. If people know everything about the research before they come in here, they may respond according to what they think we are looking for – either unconsciously or just to be helpful and cooperative. Then we wouldn't know if the responses we are getting are people's true and honest reactions or not. We would prefer not to hide anything about the research, but we also have to make sure that we are getting spontaneous and realistic responses from people. Does that make sense to you?

You've been very helpful. Thank you for all of your suggestions and for your honesty. I have to ask a favour of you before we wrap things up. It's very important that you don't discuss this study or anything I told you with anyone else. If people know what is expected of them before they come in here, their reactions in the study may be influenced in some way, and the data that we are collecting would be useless. I can't emphasize enough how important it is that people come into the study not knowing exactly what we are trying to do. With that in mind, it would be very helpful to me if you can let me know what, if anything, you heard about this study before you came here today. I don't care where or from whom you heard anything, just what you may have heard. *{Take notes}*. If anyone asks you about the study, you can just tell them what is in the SONA advertisement -- that they have to fill out questionnaires and do a computer task.

Okay, the last thing I'm going to give you is a written explanation of the study, as I've already explained it to you. Also on the handout is contact information for the Research Ethics Officer at Brock, if you have any questions about your rights as a study participant. Cari Drolet is conducting this study for her Master's thesis and Dr. Hafer in the Department of Psychology is supervising this research. If you have any questions about the research we are doing that you think of later, you can contact Dr. Hafer or Cari Drolet using the information on this handout. The results of this research will be available approximately one year from now. You can contact Cari Drolet or Dr. Hafer, or see our lab's Facebook page if you are interested in the results. Do you have any more questions? I hope you found this study interesting. Thank you for your cooperation!

APPENDIX P: Consent Following Debriefing

Fill out this section if you AGREE to have you data analysed for this study.

☐ I agree to have my data included in this study. I have made this decision based on the information that was presented during the Verbal Debriefing. I have the opportunity to receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or the Brock University Research Ethics Office. Sign below if you agree to have your data included in the study.

Name (printed)

Signature

Date

Fill out this section if you DO NOT AGREE to have you data analysed for this study.

☐ I do not agree to have my data included in this study. I have made this decision based on the information that was presented during the Verbal Debriefing. I have the opportunity to receive additional details and ask further questions by contacting the researchers or the Brock University Research Ethics Office. I understand that my data cannot be recovered once it has been removed. Sign below if you agree to have your data permanently removed from the study.

Name (printed)

Signature

Date

Participant ID: _____

APPENDIX Q: Printed Debriefing Form

Project Title: Opinions on Social Issues Questionnaire

Principal Investigator: Dr. Carolyn Hafer, Professor of Social Psychology
Department of Psychology
Brock University
(905) 688-5550 Ext. 4297; chafer@brocku.ca

Student Principal Investigator: Caroline Drolet, MA candidate
Department of Psychology
Brock University
cd11da@brocku.ca

Research Feedback

Dear Participant,

Thank you very much for participating in this study. The general purpose of this research is to examine whether people are willing to tolerate human right violations in specific situations based on deservingness judgments, despite expressing support for human rights more generally. There are many reasons why people might tolerate human rights violations. For example, if there were a utilitarian reason to use inhumane treatment (e.g., torturing an alleged terrorist to get information about a potential attack) then people may be willing to overlook the violation on the grounds that it was justified. Additionally, the perceived deservingness of the person whose rights are violated may influence the degree to which the human rights violation is tolerated. If a person were to have committed some horrible transgression, the rights violation might be tolerated because the person was seen as immoral and deserving of harsh treatment.

This research session involved two related studies. Study 1 involved answering some questions about your personal opinions, then reading and responding to scenarios that depicted stories like those you would see in the news. Amongst the opinion questions were four items assessing your support for human rights—one asked about human rights in general and the other asked about your support for the protection against torture (i.e., the right to humane treatment). Two of the scenarios you read also dealt with human rights. Specifically, the scenarios involved a violation of the right to humane treatment. In these two scenarios, the past behaviour of the main character was manipulated; one scenario was about a character who had caused minor harm (injured soldiers) and the other scenario was about a character who had caused serious harm (killed children). We expected that participants would be more willing to tolerate the rights violation when the character had caused serious harm compared to minor harm. We also expected that some people would tolerate the rights violation when the character caused serious harm to children, *even if* they support human rights overall; that is, we predicted that some people would be inconsistent in their support for human rights.

In Study 2, you were asked to write about supporting human rights. Then, you were either asked to write about supporting a specific right or about a situation in which you might have felt conflicted about supporting human rights. Those who wrote about a time when they might feel conflicted about supporting human rights were shown a scenario from Study 1 that was expected to help them recognize that they had been inconsistent between their support for human rights and their toleration of the human rights violation in the scenario (if, in fact, they had been inconsistent). Again the second writing task simply asked participants to write about supporting a particular right, so these participants should not focus on any inconsistency they might have

shown in their support for human rights. After the writing portion of the study, you were asked to fill out some general questions about your emotions and how you were feeling. If many people who did the first writing task were actually recognizing their inconsistency, then they should express more discomfort compared to people who did the second writing task (who were not made to think about inconsistencies). Additionally, you were asked to complete a portion of Study 1 a second time. Those who felt they behaved inconsistently with respect to human rights should tolerate the violation less this second time compared to when they had first read and responded to the scenarios. Before leaving, you were given the opportunity to write down your email in order to get more information on human rights. We expected that those who felt they behaved inconsistently with respect to human rights would be more likely to ask for information than other participants. If you are interested in getting more information on human rights, we have provided information on human rights organizations at the end of this form.

Now that we have more fully explained this research to you, we must ask you to please avoid telling anyone else about the details of this study and its purpose. Doing so may alter the results because people might respond differently if they know what we are looking for. This is why we did not tell you everything about this research until after you had completed this study.

If you have any comments or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Brock University Research Ethics Office at (905) 688-5550 Ext. 3035, reb@brocku.ca. If you have any other questions or concerns, please feel free to contact the investigators. Results will be available after November, 2013. If you wish to learn about the results of our research at that time, contact one of the investigators or see our Facebook page (Social Justice Lab – Brock University). We will only provide group averages and overall results, not personal information, because all data will remain anonymous and confidential.

Thank you again for your participation!

For more information on human rights and their violation, see the following Human Rights Organizations:

- *Amnesty International*—campaign to end abuses of universal human rights
website: <http://www.amnesty.org/>
- *Global Rights*—works on building grass roots movements to promote and protect the rights of marginalized populations, as well as documenting human rights abuses
website: <http://www.globalrights.org>
- *Human Rights Watch*—devoted to defending and protecting human rights
website: <http://www.hrw.org>
- *UN Watch*—monitors the performance of the UN according to its own charter
website: <http://www.unwatch.org>